

Globalization and Factor Income Taxation*

Pierre Bachas[†], Matthew Fisher-Post[‡], Anders Jensen[§], Gabriel Zucman[¶]

May 2023

Abstract

Exploiting a new global macro-historical database of effective tax rates, we uncover an intriguing pro-tax-capacity effect of international trade. While effective capital tax rates have fallen in developed countries, they have risen in developing countries since the mid-1990s. Event studies of trade liberalization shocks and instrumental variable regressions show that a significant share of this rise can be explained by trade integration, which increases the share of output produced in large corporations, where capital is easier to tax. In contrast to a widely held view, globalization appears in many countries to have supported the ability of government to tax capital.

*The database built in this paper is available online at <http://globaltaxation.world>. We acknowledge financial support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the World Bank Development Economics' Research Support Budget. Zucman acknowledges support from the Stone Foundation. We are indebted to Elie Gerschel, Rafael Proença, Roxanne Rahnema and Anton Reinicke for excellent research assistance. We thank numerous seminar participants and in particular Pierre Boyer, Damien Capelle, Denis Cogneau, Martin Fiszbein, Jason Furman, Simon Galle, Pinelopi Goldberg, Gordon Hanson, Amit Khandelwal, David Lagakos, Etienne Lehmann, Juliana Londoño-Vélez, Benjamin Marx, Sergey Nigai, Mathieu Parenti, Steven Pennings, Nam Pham, Thomas Piketty, Tristan Reed, Ariell Reshef, Bob Rijkers, Dani Rodrik, Nicholas Ryan, Emmanuel Saez, Nora Strecker, Romain Wacziarg, Daniel Yi Xu and Roman Zarate for insightful comments and discussions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

[†]ESSEC-Business School and World Bank Research, pbachas@worldbank.org

[‡]Paris School of Economics, mfp@psemail.eu

[§]Harvard Kennedy School and NBER, anders_jensen@hks.harvard.edu

[¶]Paris School of Economics, UC Berkeley and NBER, zucman@berkeley.edu

1 Introduction

How has globalization affected the relative taxation of labor and capital, and why? Has international economic integration uniformly eroded the amount of taxes paid by capital owners, shifting the tax burden to workers? Or have some countries managed to increase effective capital tax rates, and if so through which mechanisms? Answering these questions is critical to better understand the macroeconomic effects and long-run social sustainability of globalization.

This paper makes some progress on these issues by uncovering an intriguing pro-tax-capacity effect of international trade. Thanks to a new global database of effective tax rates on labor and capital, we document that in developing countries, effective capital tax rates have increased in the post-1995 era of hyper-globalization. Consistently across a variety of research designs, we find that a significant part of this rise can be explained by trade liberalization. By increasing the concentration of economic activity in formal corporate structures relative to smaller informal businesses, trade liberalization facilitates the imposition of taxes, particularly of corporate taxes. The effect is sizable: trade liberalization can explain 18-41% of the rise in effective capital tax rates in developing countries. Of course, globalization has also had widely noted negative effects on capital taxation, because of international tax competition. On balance, we find that this negative race-to-the-bottom effect has dominated in high-income countries, but that the pro-tax-capacity effect of trade we uncover has prevailed in emerging economies. In contrast to a widely held view, globalization has not uniformly eroded the ability of governments to tax capital, and in fact appears to have supported it in many countries.

To establish these results, this paper makes two contributions. The first is to build and analyze a macro-historical database of effective tax rates on labor and capital covering 155 countries with over half starting in 1965. In contrast to existing series that focus on high-income countries, this global database allows us to characterize the evolution of taxation in developing economies systematically, and thus to compare the evolution of tax structures across development levels.

A simple and striking fact emerges from this database. We uncover an asymmetric evolution of capital taxation in the era of hyper-globalization. In high-income countries, effective capital tax rates declined, from 36-38% in the post-World War II decades to about 30% in 2018. For instance, in the United States, the effective

capital income tax rate collapsed from more than 40% in the 1960s to 25% in 2018. By contrast, in developing countries effective capital tax rates have been on a rising trend since the 1990s, albeit starting from a low level. Effective capital tax rates rose from about 10% in the 1990s to 20% in 2018, with the increase happening primarily in large economies. Between the early 1990s and 2018, for example, the effective capital tax rate rose from 5% to 27% in China, 10% to 26% in Brazil, 6% to 12% in India, and 5% to 10% in Mexico. This increase is one factor explaining the rise in the overall tax-to-GDP ratio of developing countries, along with the increase of indirect taxes and a slow but steady rise in labor taxation.

This rise of capital taxation in low- and middle-income countries had not been noted in the literature before, due to the limited data on the evolution of tax structures in developing countries. The finding appears to be robust. It holds when we exclude China and oil-rich countries; when we restrict the analysis to a balanced sample of countries; and under different weighting schemes. It holds with alternative approaches to computing capital and labor income in non-corporate businesses, where factor shares are not directly observable. It is also robust to alternative ways of assigning the personal income tax to capital versus labor.

What can explain the asymmetric evolution of capital taxation across development levels? The second contribution of this paper is to formulate and test a new hypothesis that sheds light on this puzzle. Our hypothesis is motivated by the observation that the increase in capital taxation in developing countries coincides with their trade liberalization. Between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, many countries opened their markets and reduced tariffs. These policy reforms, combined with technological improvements (e.g., the rise of container shipping), led to a boom in international trade and reshaped the economy of countries such as Mexico, India, and China. We hypothesize that trade liberalization exerts a positive effect on developing countries' capacity to raise tax revenue. By leading to the expansion of larger and formal firms relative to smaller and informal firms, trade openness increases the share of economic activity in formal, corporate structures, where capital (and labor) is easier to tax.

To test this hypothesis, we implement three research designs. First, we run non-parametric estimations of within-country associations between changes in effective tax rates and changes in trade openness. Second, we analyze major trade liberalization events which occurred in seven large developing countries, including

the often-discussed WTO accession of China in 2001 ([Brandt, Biesebroeck, Wang, & Zhang, 2017](#); [Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2016](#)). These events caused large and sharp reductions in trade barriers. We use synthetic control methods to create counterfactuals for each country's event, and present event-study graphs. Last, we extend the instruments for trade openness presented in [Egger, Nigai, and Strecker \(2019\)](#) to estimate the effects of trade on effective tax rates.

In each case we find that trade openness leads to a large rise in effective capital taxation in developing countries (and a smaller increase in effective labor taxation). On the contrary, trade integration has a null or negative effect on capital taxation in high-income countries (and a positive effect on labor taxation). Although the identification strategies are different in our three empirical designs, the results are consistent across them and robust to a range of sensitivity checks.

To better understand these results, we study potential mechanisms using the event studies and instrumental variables. Consistent with our tax-capacity hypothesis, we find that trade openness leads to a rise in the fraction of domestic output that originates from the corporate sector, relative to the non-corporate business sector. This change leads to a growing fraction of output being produced in a sector that is more visible and more easily enforceable. Globally, the fraction of domestic output originating from corporations increased from 55% to 65% in developing countries between 1995 and 2018, while it remained stable at 70% in high-income countries. We also find that trade increases the average effective tax rate on capital inside the corporate sector, consistent with trade causing an expansion of larger, initially formal firms that have higher effective tax rates. We provide complementary micro-evidence from Rwanda, by merging several administrative data-sets. Using an IV based on the shift-share design of [Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang \(2014\)](#), we find that increased integration to international trade at the firm level causes an increase in the individual firm's effective tax rate on capital.

We also find that the positive impact of trade on capital taxation, in addition to being concentrated in developing countries, is stronger in populous countries and in countries with restrictions on capital flows. This finding is consistent with the notion that large countries and countries managing their capital accounts are less exposed to the race-to-the-bottom effect that has pushed capital taxation down in high-income countries. Last, trade liberalization is associated with a decline in statutory corporate tax rates across all countries, but more so in high-income coun-

tries. On net, the trade-induced increase in tax capacity dominates the statutory tax rate reduction in developing countries, but not in rich countries.

We conclude by discussing implications for public finance and globalization in developing countries. Despite potential revenue losses at the border, the positive impacts of trade on the domestic tax bases of capital and labor are sufficiently large that overall tax revenue increases. This is a policy relevant result, as potential tax revenue losses arising from trade liberalization remain an important concern amongst policy-makers ([United Nations, 2001](#)). Moreover, we find that the positive effect of trade on effective taxation is larger for capital than for labor. Given the higher concentration of capital income relative to labor income, changes in taxation induced by trade liberalization may have attenuated some of the distributional impacts of economic integration on pre-tax income ([Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007](#)).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following sub-section, we relate our work to the existing literature. Section 2 describes the methodology and data collection. Section 3 presents our findings on the evolution of effective tax rates over the long-run. Section 4 presents our results on the effects of trade openness on effective tax rates, and Section 5 investigates mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.

1.1 Related literature

Globalization and tax structure Our paper contributes to the macro-oriented literature on globalization and tax structure, reviewed in [Adam, Kammas, and Rodriguez \(2013\)](#). Starting with [Rodrik \(1998\)](#), several papers investigate the ‘social insurance’ hypothesis, whereby governments raise revenue to provide insurance to workers displaced by international competition. A second hypothesis, the ‘race to the bottom’, posits that governments reduce taxes on factors that become more mobile (e.g., capital) following trade liberalization ([Clausing, 2016](#); [Hines, 2006](#)). To achieve revenue-neutrality, governments may then raise taxes on the less mobile factor (e.g., labor). Within labor, [Egger et al. \(2019\)](#) find that in the post-1995 period, globalization led to a reduction in income taxes for the top 1% of workers (more mobile) and a rise for middle class workers (less mobile). [Epifani and Gancia \(2009\)](#) study the role of terms-of-trade externalities and [Alesina and Wacziarg \(1998\)](#) focus on population size. These studies mainly concern high-income countries. By expanding the scope to developing countries, we formulate and test a new

mechanism, where the trade-induced relaxation of enforcement constraints allows governments to tax capital and labor more effectively. We find that this tax-capacity mechanism operates primarily in developing countries, but the race-to-the-bottom and social-insurance mechanisms are active at all development levels.

A few studies investigate whether openness has had positive or negative impacts on total tax revenue in developing countries (Baunsgaard & Keen, 2009; Buettner & Madzharova, 2018; Cagé & Gadenne, 2018), with differing findings that may result from differences in openness measures, identification and samples covered. We complement this body of work by drawing on multiple identification strategies, a comprehensive sample of countries and long time series. Our results indicate that openness has caused an overall increase in tax revenues in developing countries.

Constructing our long-run series required archival work to digitize numerous countries' historical public finance records. Our database complements other work in economic history on taxation trends (including in Africa, see Cogneau, Dupraz, Knebelmann, & Mesplé-Somps, 2021) by measuring long-run changes in effective tax rates on capital and labor.

Tax capacity and trade in developing countries Our tax capacity mechanism is related to the micro-oriented literature on trade and public finance in developing countries. Most studies focus on evasion of *border taxes* (e.g., Fisman & Wei, 2004; Javorcik & Narciso, 2017) or cross-border income-shifting by firms and individuals (e.g., Bilicka, 2019; Bustos, Pomeranz, Vila-Belda, & Zucman, 2019; Londoño-Vélez & Tortarolo, 2022; Wier, 2020). Our new mechanism emphasizes the impacts of trade on domestic economic structure and *domestic direct tax bases* of capital and labor.¹ Our micro and macro-results are intuitive when considering that the trade literature finds positive effects on domestic outcomes including market shares (McCaig & Pavcnik, 2018), firm size (Alfaro-Ureña, Manelici, & Vasquez, 2022), and local development (Méndez & Van Patten, 2022), which the public finance literature has separately identified as important determinants of tax capacity (Besley & Persson, 2014). Our paper tries to link these two bodies of work by directly testing the impacts of trade openness on domestic tax bases. These impacts are mediated by

¹A theoretical literature focuses on analyzing trade's impact on the optimal indirect tax mix between border taxes and domestic consumption taxes (e.g., Emran & Stiglitz, 2005; Keen & Ligthart, 2002), but has abstracted from the role of direct taxes on capital and labor. Benzarti and Tazhitdinova (2021) empirically study the impact of domestic consumption taxes on trade flows.

trade's effect on the share of domestic output produced in formal firms. Our results are compatible with findings from recent trade-formalization studies, which have instead focused on the share of formal workers or firms (as detailed in Section 5).

Our mechanism focuses on the role of corporations in alleviating enforcement constraints. In high-income countries, the rise of the corporate sector is considered an important historical determinant of the long-run growth in tax collection (Kleven, Kreiner, & Saez, 2016). Similarly, tax collection is strongly concentrated in corporations in developing countries today (Basri, Felix, Hanna, & Olken, 2021), because they have complex production structures, are large in size, and employ many workers, resulting in information trails that make it harder to misreport taxes (Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, & Saez, 2011; Naritomi, 2019; Pomeranz, 2015). We focus on a specific enforcement mechanism, but many links between international trade, firm structure, and taxation remain to be explored in developing countries (Atkin & Khandelwal, 2020; Parenti, 2018).

2 Construction of Effective Tax Rates

This section presents our new database of effective tax rates (ETR) on labor and capital, which covers 155 countries, starting in 1965 when possible, until 2018. We first outline the conceptual framework to build ETR , then present the data sources, and finally discuss the sample coverage. Further details are in Appendix B.

2.1 Methodology

Effective tax rates We compute macroeconomic effective tax rates following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The effective tax rate on labor, denoted ETR_L , is the total amount of taxes effectively collected on labor divided by total labor income in the economy; similarly for capital, denoted ETR_K :

$$ETR_L = \frac{T_L}{Y_L} \quad \text{and} \quad ETR_K = \frac{T_K}{Y_K} \quad (1)$$

To construct the numerator, each type of tax revenue is assigned to labor or capital:

$$T_L = \sum_j \lambda_j \cdot \tau_j \quad \text{and} \quad T_K = \sum_j (1 - \lambda_j) \cdot \tau_j \quad (2)$$

where λ_j is the allocation to labor of each type j of tax τ_j . Types of taxes j follow the OECD Revenue classification. We allocate taxes as follows: (1) corporate income taxes, wealth taxes, and property taxes are allocated to capital; (2) payroll taxes and social security payments are allocated to labor; (3) personal income taxes are allocated partly to labor and partly to capital, in a country-time specific manner (details below). Indirect taxes are neither assigned to labor nor to capital (but analyzed directly in Section 4.3). Table B2 provides a detailed allocation summary.

To construct the denominator, we decompose net domestic product as follows:

$$Y = Y_L + Y_K = \underbrace{CE + \phi \cdot OS_{PUE}}_{Y_L} + \underbrace{(1 - \phi) \cdot OS_{PUE} + OS_{CORP} + OS_{HH}}_{Y_K} \quad (3)$$

Labor income Y_L equals compensation of employees (CE) plus a share ϕ of mixed income (operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises OS_{PUE}). Capital income Y_K equals the remaining share $(1 - \phi)$ of mixed income, plus firms' profits net of depreciation (operating surplus of corporations OS_{CORP}), plus actual and imputed rental income (operating surplus of households OS_{HH}).²

The *ETR* are macroeconomic effective tax rates that capture the total and economically relevant tax wedges on each factor of production (i.e., the wedges that matter for production decisions), such as the difference between the costs to employ a worker and what the worker receives. Since national account statistics are compiled following harmonized standards and methods, these *ETRs* are conceptually comparable over time and across countries, although a number of data limitations (discussed below) need to be kept in mind. By relying on taxes effectively collected, our *ETRs* incorporate the net past effects of all tax rules—including base reductions, exemptions, and tax credits—and avoidance and evasion behavior.

As recognized in the literature (see Carey & Rabesona, 2004), these macroeconomic *ETRs* rely on several conventions and assumptions. First, as is done in the literature, they do not factor in behavioral responses in the sense that taxes are not

²We decompose net domestic product (NDP), which subtracts the consumption of fixed capital from gross domestic product (GDP). NDP is thus lower than GDP by around 10% on average. We exclude capital depreciation from our measurement since it does not accrue to any factors of production and it is usually tax-exempt. Our measure of factor incomes also excludes net indirect taxes (which are also excluded in the numerator of *ETR*).

“shifted” from one factor of production to another; all labor taxes are allocated to labor and all capital taxes are allocated to capital. Second, the tax revenue streams need to be comparable to their macroeconomic tax bases measured in the national accounts. This generates two key challenges for our *ETRs*: (i) for the numerator, what share of personal income tax revenues to allocate to capital versus labor; and (ii) for the denominator, what share of mixed income to allocate to capital versus labor. We outline below our benchmark assumptions for these cases, while an in-depth discussion is provided in Appendix B.2.

Allocation of personal income taxes (PIT) The main empirical difficulty in assigning taxes to labor or capital concerns the allocation of the PIT. A naive procedure allocates 70% of the PIT to labor and 30% to capital, roughly matching the labor and capital shares of domestic product. In practice, however, not all labor and capital income is subject to PIT, since not all individuals are required to file PIT and exemptions apply to some income types. Exemptions for capital (e.g., imputed housing rents, undistributed profits) are typically larger than for labor (e.g., pension contributions). Further, labor and capital income might not face the same tax rate: dual income tax systems tax labor income with progressive rates but capital income with flat rates. In the United States, 75% of labor income was subject to PIT in 2015, versus a third of capital income (Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). This suggests allocating 15% of the personal income tax to capital and 85% to labor.³

Starting from a baseline where 15% of PIT revenues derive from capital (consistent with US data) we perform two country-year adjustments. We raise capital revenues for country-years with a high PIT exemption threshold in the income distribution, using data from Jensen (2022), and lower it in country-years where dividends face lower taxes than wages. The resulting capital share of PIT revenue varies between 7% and 35%, depending on countries and years. Over time, this share falls from a global average of 19% in 1965 to 14% in 2018, due to a reduction in PIT exemption thresholds and increased prevalence of dual tax systems.

The labor share of mixed income The labor share of mixed income (unincorporated enterprises) is notoriously hard to measure (Gollin, 2002). For our benchmark

³If 75% of labor income is taxable and labor income is 70% of national income (respectively 33% and 30% for capital income), then $75\% \times 70\% / (75\% \times 70\% + 33\% \times 30\%) = 84\%$ of the PIT base is from labor income.

series we assume $\phi = 75\%$, i.e., 25% of mixed income is considered capital income.⁴ We also construct two bounding scenarios shown in robustness: (i) mixed-income is assumed to be 100% labor; and (ii) the country-year varying labor share of the corporate sector is assigned as labor’s share of mixed income.

The exact *ETR* formulas which integrate the above adjustments are in Appendix B.2, including details on the distinction between time-variant and invariant components. Importantly, the labor share of mixed income is time-invariant in our benchmark, but we allow it to be country-time specific in a robustness check.

2.2 Data sources

2.2.1 National income

To measure factor incomes for 155 countries since 1965 when possible, we create a panel of national accounts using data from the System of National Accounts (SNA) produced by the United Nations. We begin by using the 2008 SNA online repository that has global coverage in more recent decades. In turn, the UN Statistics Division provided access to the 1968 SNA offline data which covers historical observations from the 1960s and 1970s for most countries. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to harmonize and integrate the 2008-SNA and 1968-SNA datasets. To estimate factor incomes requires information on all the components of national income (equation 3). Whenever we have national income for a country-year in an SNA data-set but information on a component is missing, we attempt to recover it using both information from the second SNA data-set as well as national accounting identities with non-missing values for the other income components. In the remaining cases, we impute component values using methods developed in the DINA guidelines (Blanchet et al., 2021). Details are in Appendix B.1.

Relative to recent work (including Guerriero, 2019; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014), our national accounts data expands coverage in space and time and systematically attempts to measure factor incomes for total domestic output (vs. only for the corporate sector).

⁴This is slightly lower than the 30% used in Distributional National Accounts (DINA) guidelines (Blanchet, Chancel, Flores, & Morgan, 2021), but given that the global average of the capital share in the corporate sector is 27%, assuming that the capital share of unincorporated enterprises is slightly lower seems reasonable (see Guerriero, 2019).

2.2.2 Tax revenue

We construct a new tax revenue dataset that dis-aggregates revenues by type following the OECD Revenue Statistics classification of taxes. Our database includes all taxes—on personal and corporate income, social security and payroll, property, wealth and inheritance, and consumption—at all levels of government. We ensure a systematic separation of income taxes into personal and corporate income. We collect new archival data and integrate it with pre-existing data sources.

When available, OECD Revenue Statistics data ([link](#)) is our preferred source, as it covers all types of tax revenues and goes back to 1965 for OECD countries. It accounts for 2,866 country-year observations (42.3% of the sample). Its drawback is its limited coverage of non-OECD countries, as it covers 93 countries in total and only developing countries more recently. We add data from ICTD ([link](#)). ICTD includes most developing countries, with coverage that starts in the 1980s. ICTD sometimes combines personal and corporate income taxes, and it often lacks social security/payroll taxes. ICTD adds 1,249 country-year observations (18.3% of the sample). To complement these pre-existing sources, we conducted an archival data-collection to digitize and harmonize data from historical public budgets and national statistical yearbooks.⁵ We supplemented the archival data-collection with countries' online publications and offline data from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (1972-1989). These new data-sources add 2,681 observations (39.4% of the sample), of which 2,011 come from our archival work.

We follow three principles to create each country's time series. First, we aim to only combine two data sources by country. OECD is the preferred starting point. Archival data is initially second in priority since it often dis-aggregates tax types and goes back far in time, but we revise this based on the source that best matches the OECD data in overlapping time-periods. Second, we only interpolate up to 4 years of gaps in coverage. Third, we draw on country-specific studies to gauge the credibility of the historical archival data. Appendix [B.1](#) provides more details.

2.3 Data coverage of effective tax rates

Our final effective tax rates sample contains 6,816 country-year observations in 155 countries (Figure [A1](#)). The number of countries starts at 78 in 1965 and grows to

⁵These archives were accessed in the Government Section of the Lamont Library ([website link](#)).

110 by 1975 (due to independence or country creation). The key jump in coverage—from 117 to 148 countries—corresponds to the entry of ex-communist countries in 1994, including China when it arguably built a modern tax system (see [World Bank, 2008](#) and box in Appendix B.1). The data is effectively composed of two quasi-balanced panels. The first covers 1965-1993 and excludes communist regimes, accounting for 85-90% of world GDP. The second covers 1994-2018 and includes former communist countries, accounting for 98% of world GDP. Figure A1 shows coverage by development level. We use the World Bank income classification in 2018, assigning low and middle-income countries (LMICs) as developing countries and high-income countries (HICs) as developed countries. We will interchangeably refer to LMICs as developing countries and HICs as developed countries. Our sample contains 5,198 observations in LMICs and 1,618 observations in HICs.

Compared to existing *ETR* series which cover mainly OECD countries over more limited time periods (notably [Carey & Rabesona, 2004](#); [McDaniel, 2007](#); [Mendoza et al., 1994](#)), our series are global and begin in 1965 whenever possible. They also represent a methodological improvement by covering all tax revenues and all income sources in national accounts.⁶

3 Stylized Facts on Global Taxation Trends

3.1 Evolution of effective tax rates on capital and labor

Figure 1 documents the global evolution of effective tax rates on capital and labor from 1965 to 2018. These time series follow our benchmark assumptions. Aggregates are dollar-weighted, i.e., the global effective tax rate on capital equals worldwide capital tax revenues divided by worldwide capital income. This series can be interpreted as the average tax rate on a dollar of capital income derived from owning an asset representative of the world’s capital stock. The top panel shows global trends and the bottom panels separate trends between HICs and LMICs.

Globally, effective tax rates on labor and capital converged between 1965 and 2018, due to a rise in labor taxation and a drop in capital taxation. The global ETR_L rose from 16% in the mid-1960s to 25% in the late 2010s, while ETR_K fell from 32%

⁶Compared to existing studies, we integrate all types of capital taxes; allocate personal income taxes into labor and capital; and, assign mixed income to its labor and capital parts.

to 26%. The decline in capital taxation is driven by the corporate sector: the global effective tax rate on corporate profits fell from 27% in 1965 to 18% in 2018.

The global trends mask heterogeneity by development levels. While labor taxation rose everywhere, the decline in capital taxation is concentrated in HICs, where the effective tax rate on capital fell from 36-38% to about 30% between 1965 and 2018. In contrast, ETR_K increased in LMICs, albeit from a low base: it rose from 10% to 20%, with the increase happening entirely after 1995. The secular decline in ETR_K in HICs has been documented before (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, & Thornock, 2017; Garcia-Bernardo, Janský, & Tørsløv, 2022), but the rise in ETR_K in LMICs starting in the 1990s is novel. We thus need to establish that this result is robust to the assumptions used to construct the ETR series.

3.2 The rise of capital taxation in developing countries

When creating our ETR series, we make four key methodological decisions: (1) how to allocate personal income tax revenue to capital vs labor; (2) how to allocate mixed income to capital vs labor; (3) to present results for a balanced vs. unbalanced panel of countries; (4) how to weight individual countries when aggregating them. Our benchmark series: (1) allocates personal income taxes to capital vs. labor for each country-year using data on tax exemption thresholds and differential tax treatment of dividends relative to wages; (2) allocates 25% of mixed income to capital and 75% to labor; (3) consists of two quasi-balanced panels before and after 1994 (when China, Russia and other former command economies enter the sample); and (4) weighs countries using their share of worldwide factor income in each year. We can assess how the results change when varying one, several, or all of these choices at the same time.

Figure 2 tests the robustness of the ETR_K trend in LMICs.⁷ Panel (a) varies the allocation of personal income tax (PIT) revenue. We consider two simple scenarios where the share allocated to capital is fixed over time, at either 0% or 30%, which can be interpreted as low and high-end scenarios respectively. Due to high PIT exemption thresholds in developing countries, the benchmark country-specific assignment is closer to the 30% than to the 0% allocation. The reduction of PIT exemption thresholds and the introduction of preferential tax rates for dividends

⁷Figure A2 shows the robustness checks for ETR_L in LMICs and ETR_L and ETR_K in HICs.

in several countries lowered the capital share of PIT revenues over time, pushing ETR_K down. But since PIT revenues remain limited in LMICs, its split into labor vs. capital makes little difference to our results.

Panel (b) shows that assumptions on the capital share of mixed income (unincorporated enterprises) are somewhat more consequential. In the upper bound scenario, we assume that all mixed income is labor. This reduces the capital income denominator and raises ETR_K . The upper bound ETR_K is particularly high in the earlier decades (when mixed income is higher), and then declines to reach a low point in the mid-1990s. A large rise is observed after 1995, as in the benchmark series. In the lower bound scenario, we assign to mixed income the country-time varying capital share of the corporate sector – which assumes that unincorporated and incorporated enterprises are equally capital intensive. This ETR_K series is slightly below the benchmark in terms of levels but tracks it closely over time.

Panel (c) quantifies the effect of country entry into the sample. In our benchmark series, China, Russia, and other former command economies only enter the sample in 1994. In this robustness check, we balance the panel by imputing missing country observations between 1965 and 1993; we use the observed value of ETR_K for that country in 1994 and the trends in ETR_K observed for LMICs with data 1965-1993. This imputation somewhat raises capital taxation between 1965 and 1993, since the new entrants (especially Russia) had relatively high ETR_K when they enter the sample in 1994 and a high global weight when going back in time.

Next, panel (d) aggregates countries using net domestic product (NDP) weights, instead of the capital income weights in our benchmark series. The NDP weights are either time varying or fixed in 2010. The figure shows that the weighting procedure has limited impact on the results.

Finally, panel (e) considers all 54 combinations of the 4 methodological choices. Some series are more volatile than others, especially between 1965-1993, yet the rise in ETR_K in developing countries between 1994-2018 is clearly apparent in all series. The rise in ETR_K between its low point in 1989 and its high point in 2018 is 10.8 percentage points on average across the 54 combinations, with a range of 6.2-13.4ppt. Our benchmark series is slightly towards the lower end of ETR_K combinations in terms of levels, but in the middle of the range in terms of its rise (10.2 percentage points increase from 1989 to 2018).

3.3 Where has capital taxation risen the most?

Figure 3 shows the evolution of ETR_K for major developing countries and sub-samples of countries. Panel (a) plots the ETR_K series for the four largest LMICs: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia. All display a marked increase in ETR_K since the early 1990s: from 10% to 26% in Brazil, 5% to 27% in China, 6% to 12% in India, and 10% to 15% in Indonesia. China's global income weight implies that it plays an important role in the aggregate rise in ETR_K in developing countries.

Panel (b) plots ETR_K in sub-samples of developing countries. When excluding China, the rise in ETR_K is more muted, going from 10% in 1989 to 14% in 2018. Oil-rich countries (defined as deriving at least 7% of GDP from oil in 2018) have volatile corporate tax revenues and their ETR_K has trended downwards since the 1970s. Excluding oil-rich countries yields a more pronounced ETR_K rise (from 10% in 1989 to 23% in 2018), and a flatter ETR_K series pre-1989 as the revenue impacts of the 1970s oil shocks are removed. If we exclude both China and oil-rich countries, we again observe a substantial rise in ETR_K .

Panel (c) shows that, among non oil-rich countries, the ETR_K rise is stronger in the 19 largest LMICs (population above 40 million in 2018). Even when excluding China, the ETR_K of the other 18 most populated countries rose from 9% to 17% between 1989 and 2018, as compared to a rise from 9 to 13% in smaller countries.⁸ In short, the rise in effective capital taxation in LMICs goes beyond the case of China and appears to be a general pattern in developing countries.

3.4 Suggestive evidence for the role of globalization

We found that while ETR_K has fallen in HICs, it actually has risen in LMICs. The rise in ETR_K in LMICs is robust to our assumptions, and although driven especially by larger countries, it is a widespread phenomenon. Importantly, this rise occurred in the 1990s to early 2000s, during the period of "hyper-globalization" which should a priori have made capital more mobile and hence harder to tax. Instead, could globalization have caused a rise in ETR_K in LMICs? In this subsection, we take

⁸The [supplementary appendix \(link\)](#) shows individual countries' ETR_K time series for the most populated LMICs: ETR_K has risen by more than 5 percentage points in twelve of them in the past 30 years, and has only fallen in Russia.

a first pass at investigating the role that trade globalization may have played in impacting the differential trends of capital taxation in LMICs vs HICs.

We create 5-year growth rates within countries in trade and ETR_K s. We plot binned scatters of ETR against trade openness (measured as the share of imports and exports over GDP), after residualizing all variables against year fixed effects. Figure 4 depicts these within-country associations, which condition on global time trends. Mirroring the heterogeneity in long-run trends, we observe large differences by development level in the association between trade and ETR_K : trade openness is associated with increases in ETR_K in LMICs, but with decreases in ETR_K in HICs.⁹ In sum, from a global and historical perspective, the correlational evidence suggests that trade liberalization may have contributed to the newly documented rise in effective capital taxation in developing countries. In the next sections, we try to causally investigate this hypothesis and study potential mechanisms.

4 Globalization and Capital Taxation

In this section, we implement two distinct research designs to investigate the impact of trade openness on capital taxation in developing countries.

4.1 Event-studies for trade liberalization

4.1.1 Empirical design

In the first design, we implement event studies of trade liberalization events in key developing countries. To discern sharp breaks from trends in our outcomes, we analyze events which caused large trade barrier reductions: we focus on the six events studied in the review papers by [Goldberg and Pavcnik \(2007, 2016\)](#) (Colombia in 1985, Mexico in 1985, Brazil in 1988, Argentina in 1989, India in 1991, Vietnam in 2001), and add the often discussed World Trade Organization accession of China in 2001 ([Brandt et al., 2017](#)). Most of these liberalization events were characterized by large reductions in tariffs: from 59% to 15% in Brazil; 80% to 39%

⁹Figure A3 probes the trade- ETR_K correlation in LMICs further by separating the countries into two groups based on their trade level pre-1995. Early globalized LMICs saw trade and ETR_K rise in tandem prior to the 1990s and stagnate thereafter. By contrast, LMICs which participated in the second wave of globalization post-1995 saw a rise in trade and ETR_K in the 1995-2018 period.

in India; and, 48% to 20% in China. Moreover, these events have been extensively studied, so we can rely on pre-existing narrative analyses to discuss threats to identification and interpretation of the results.¹⁰ Appendix C.1 details all seven trade liberalization events.

For each of the seven treated countries and outcome, we construct a synthetic control country, as a weighted average over the donor pool of never-treated countries, as in [Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller \(2010\)](#).¹¹ We match on the level of each outcome in the 10 years prior to the event, while minimizing the mean squared prediction error between the event-country and the synthetic control (Table A1). We plot the average levels of the outcome variable for treated countries vs. synthetic control countries by relative time to the event. We also estimate the event-study model in the 10 years before and 10 years after the events:

$$y_{ct} = \sum_{e=-10, e \neq -1}^{10} \beta_e \cdot \mathbb{1}(e = t)_t \cdot D_c + \theta_t + \kappa_c + \pi_{Year(t)} + \epsilon_{ct} \quad (4)$$

where we include fixed effects for event-time, θ_t , country κ_c , and calendar year, $\pi_{Year(t)}$ (the latter control for common shocks to outcomes that may correlate with event clusters). D_c is a dummy equal to one if country c is treated. The coefficient β_e captures the difference between treated and synthetic control countries in event time e , relative to the pre-reform year $e = -1$ (omitted period).

Since inference based on small samples is challenging, we plot 95% confidence bounds using the wild bootstrap, clustered at the country event level. We run two additional specifications to attenuate issues with synthetic control event studies. First, we estimate a simple difference-in-differences which captures the average treatment effect in the 10 years post-liberalization, and use the imputation method of [Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess \(2021\)](#) to address challenges from two-way fixed effects and heterogeneous event-times. Second, we simultaneously match on all outcomes of interest for each country event, instead of creating a separate synthetic control for each event and each outcome. This reduces the likelihood of obtaining similar pre-trends, but implies that for a given country event, the synthetic control countries are the same across outcomes.

¹⁰The reductions in trade barriers are sometimes implemented over several years. To be conservative, we focus on the earliest start year for each event as defined in published studies.

¹¹For each country-event, we can include eventually-treated countries in the donor-pool (excluding those with treatment within 5 years of the event); the results, available upon request, are similar.

4.1.2 Event-study results

Figure 5 displays the event studies in levels (left-hand panels) and the dynamic regression coefficients (right-hand panels).¹² The top panels show that, as expected, trade rises in the year of the event and its trend changes in post-reform years compared to pre-liberalization years.¹³ Turning to our outcomes of interest, we see that ETR_K sharply rises following liberalization events. Both ETR_K and ETR_L break from the stable pre-trend at the time of liberalization, but the effect on capital taxation is double that on labor. Despite the small sample size, the dynamic post-treatment coefficients are often significant at the 5% level. The p-value for the joint significance of all post-reform dummies are well below 0.05. The liberalization events led to a 6.4 percentage point rise in trade openness over 10 years, and a 4.5 (2.0) percentage point rise in ETR_K (ETR_L) (coefficients in Table A2).

We conduct three robustness checks. First, the absence of pre-trends was stronger for ETR outcomes than for trade. Alternatively, we can jointly match on all outcomes for each event to create synthetic controls. Figure A6 shows that this leads to a general deterioration of pre-trends (as expected), but the regression coefficients remain comparable (Table A2). Second, to ensure that the results are not unduly influenced by one particular event, we remove one treated country at a time: Figure A5 shows robust dynamic treatment effects for all subsets of treated countries. Third, results are similar when we re-estimate the difference-in-differences coefficients using the imputation method of Borusyak et al. (2021) to attenuate issues with two-way fixed effects estimation (Table A2).

Trade liberalization could coincide with unobserved changes in determinants of effective tax rates. Two elements ease this concern. First, the stable pre-trends in treated countries imply that any confounding changes would have to sharply coincide with the events. Second, the narrative analyses of the reforms (reproduced in Appendix C), do not suggest obvious confounding shocks.

Naturally, the interpretation of the post-event coefficients is influenced by the potential presence of other reforms or economic shocks that occurred in the years following the liberalization event. For example, Mexico later joined NAFTA and removed capital inflow restrictions, Argentina and Brazil joined MERCOSUR, and

¹²Table A1 details the synthetic control matching for each event and each outcome.

¹³The absence of a pre-reform dip limits concerns about inter-temporal substitution, although some of the liberalization events may have been predictable, including China's WTO accession.

India liberalized its FDI rules (Appendix C). These additional cross-border reforms occurred several years after the initial trade liberalization events, yet capital taxation sharply rises in the immediate post-liberalization years.¹⁴ The short-run results showing a sharp break from stable pre-trends are thus more likely to be attributable to trade liberalization. We caution, however, that the precise medium-run coefficients might reflect the impact of additional reforms.¹⁵

4.2 Regressions with instrumental variables for trade

4.2.1 Empirical design

Our second design employs instrumental variables for trade. One attractive feature is that the IV provides causal estimates under different identifying assumptions than the event-study. Moreover, while it is harder to directly inspect the identifying assumptions than in the event-study, the IV permits a precise investigation of mechanisms and heterogeneity by development level (which we turn to in Section 5). We estimate the following model in developing countries:

$$y_{ct} = \mu \cdot trade_{ct} + \Theta \cdot X_{ct} + \pi_c + \pi_t + \epsilon_{ct} \quad (5)$$

where y_{ct} is the *ETR* in country c in year t , $trade_{ct}$ is the share of import and exports in NDP and π_c and π_t are country and year fixed effects. We cluster ϵ_{ct} at the country level. We also estimate models which include (in X_{ct}) confounding determinants of *ETR*: the exchange rate, gross capital formation, log of population, and capital openness (Chinn & Ito, 2006; Rodrik, 1997). Individual countries' *ETR* time-series can feature volatile yearly changes (Figure 3); to improve precision, we winsorize *ETR* at the 5%-95% level by year separately for LMICs and HICs.

¹⁴Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) study if trade liberalization events in developing countries coincide with domestic reforms. Among our seven events, only Mexico had a confounding domestic reform (privatization) at the time of the liberalization event; Brazil (privatization) and Colombia (market-oriented reforms) implemented reforms in post-liberalization years; the remaining four countries had no confounding reforms. The results are robust to excluding Mexico (Figure A5).

¹⁵Spillovers to control countries is an important concern. We verify that none of the main countries in the synthetic control (Table A1) implemented significant international or domestic reforms in the post-event years (using the data in Wacziarg & Wallack, 2004). Consistent with this, the levels of the outcomes in the synthetic control are relatively stable throughout the event periods (more so in Figure A6 than in Figure 5). Finally, note that if the spillovers correspond to coordination of policies, then this would likely bias our estimation towards finding null results.

The OLS estimation of equation (5) may be biased due to reverse causality and unobservable confounding factors which correlate with changes in trade. To try to address these issues, we use the two instruments for trade from [Egger et al. \(2019\)](#). The first instrument, denoted $Z^{gravity}$, relies on the structure of general equilibrium models of trade. Under the standard gravity model assumptions, it uses the average bilateral trade frictions between exporting and importing countries as variation (aggregated to the country-year level). In our context, this instrument is valid if the distribution (not the level) of trade costs among individual country-trading pairs is not influenced by the *ETR* in the import or export country. The second instrument, denoted $Z^{oil-distance}$, exploits time-series variation in global oil prices interacted with a country-specific measure of access to international markets. Access is captured by the variance of distance to the closest maritime port for the three most populated cities. This time-invariant measure captures the internal geography of a country which is an important component of transportation costs: following a global shock to oil prices, transportation costs will be higher in countries with less concentrated access to ports, leading to a larger drop in imports and exports. Conceptually, both instruments capture variation in trade costs driven by plausibly exogenous economic forces (details in Appendix D).

In LMICs, Figure A4 shows that $Z^{oil-dist}$ has a strong first stage in the 2000s and at higher levels of NDP per capita, while $Z^{gravity}$ has a stronger first-stage in the earlier periods and at lower NDP per capita. Restricting our analysis to subsamples where one of the instruments has a strong first-stage would introduce bias ([Mogstad, Torgovitsky, & Walters, 2021](#)). Instead we combine the two instruments, which raises statistical power and allows us to estimate a local average treatment effect (LATE) that is representative of developing countries across income levels and time periods. The LATE based on multiple instruments is a combination of the instrument-specific LATEs weighted by their first-stage strength.

Table A3 shows the first-stage regression, which highlights that $Z^{gravity}$ raises trade while $Z^{oil-dist}$ reduces trade. Moreover, Table E2 shows that the instruments impact both imports and exports, and both trade in intermediate goods-services (G-S) and final G-S. Thus, our IV-estimates based on the two instruments comprehensively reflect the impacts of trade through rises and falls in final and intermediate goods and services that flow both in and out of the country.

4.2.2 Instrumental variable results

Table 1 presents the results in LMICs for ETR_K in Panel A and for ETR_L in Panel B.¹⁶ In column (1), OLS uncovers positive, significant associations between trade and both ETR_K and ETR_L . In column (2), we employ the two instruments. The 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 24.57. The IV shows that trade causes an increase in capital and labor effective tax rates, but the magnitude is almost twice as large for ETR_K (0.109) than for ETR_L (0.056).

In the remaining columns, we conduct three sets of robustness checks. In the first set, we modify the specification and the inclusion of covariates. Column (3) shows that the results remain unchanged when we use non-winsorized $ETRs$. Column (4) re-estimates the IV with NDP weights (used in Section 3 for representativity), which increases magnitudes but decreases statistical significance. Results remain similar in column (5) when we include country-year varying controls in X_{ct} . In column (6), our results are robust to allowing oil-rich countries to be on a separate non-parametric time path. This addresses the concern that the estimating variation for $Z^{oil-dist}$ is correlated with trends in effective tax rates specific to oil-rich countries (Figure 3). In column (7), we winsorize the trade variable; this improves the first-stage F-statistic (34.83), but the IV-estimates remain very similar.

In the second robustness set, we implement the alternative capital vs labor assignments from Section 3.2. In our benchmark ETR , the capital share of mixed income is time-invariant, yet trade may cause factor shares to change. In column (8), we instead use the ETR measure where the capital-share of mixed income varies by country-year; consistent with trade having a positive impact on the capital share (which we find in Section 5), the coefficient for ETR_K is smaller (0.100). Results remain similar when we assign the K -share of PIT to be 0% (column 9) and 30% (column 10). In the third robustness set (columns 11-12), we estimate IVs using each instrument separately. The 1st-stage F-statistic is 45.17 for $Z^{gravity}$ and 10.80 for $Z^{oil-dist}$. The IV estimates are comparable to each other, though larger for $Z^{oil-dist}$.

Finally, in Table A3 we study the reduced-form impact of trade on $ETRs$. Leveraging the fact that the two instruments have opposite sign effects on trade, the reduced form results suggest that the effects of globalization are symmetric:

¹⁶There is a 4% drop in sample size relative to ETR coverage (Section 2.3) due to availability of instruments. Relative to previous versions of this paper, recent access to trade data from Harvard Growth Lab increased the sample size for the instruments and led to updated results.

expanded openness increases both ETR_L and ETR_K , while reduced cross-border trade decreases the effective taxation of both factors.

Taking stock How much of the rise in ETR_K in LMICs since the 1990s can be accounted for by increased trade? Between 1989 and 2018, NDP-weighted trade openness increased by 18.7ppt (from 44.7% to 63.4%), while ETR_K rose by 10.2ppt (Section 3.2). The NDP-weighted IV for trade’s impact on ETR_K (column 4 of Table 1) is arguably the most comparable estimate, since the ETR_K trends in Section 3 are also weighted by national income. Using this estimate would imply that trade openness can account for 41% of the rise in ETR_K ($0.222 * 0.187 / 0.102 = 0.407$). At the same time, the NDP-weighted coefficient is also our largest IV estimate; considering the full set of estimates in Table 1 generates a range of 18%-41% (with the main specification of column 2 at 20%).

4.3 Impacts of trade openness on overall taxation

We find positive effects of openness on the collection of capital and labor taxes – what are the implications for trade’s impact on *overall* tax collection? This is a policy-relevant question, as revenue losses arising from trade liberalization remains an important concern amongst practitioners in LMICs (United Nations, 2001).

We investigate trade’s impacts on total tax revenue (% of NDP) in developing countries in Table 2, with OLS in Panel A and IV in Panel B. Total taxes include direct taxes on capital and labor and indirect taxes (sum of taxes on trade and domestic consumption).¹⁷ Both in OLS and IV, the trade-coefficient for total tax collection is positive and statistically significant (column 1). Focusing on the IV results in Panel B, the next columns show that this increase in total revenue is mainly driven by corporate income taxes and social security, the two main sources of effective taxation of capital and labor. The final column shows a statistically insignificant impact of openness on indirect taxes (trade and consumption taxes); the coefficient is also quantitatively small in comparison to the sum of the coefficients on direct labor and capital taxes (which account for 78% of the trade-coefficient for total taxes). Table A4 shows that trade’s positive impact on total tax collection using IV is robust

¹⁷Our data does not permit a systematic breakdown into trade and consumption taxes. Long-run trends in taxation by type and development level are in the [supplementary appendix \(link\)](#).

to using NDP weights for estimation; including various controls; winsorizing the trade variable; and, estimating IVs using each instrument separately.

We can also study the impact of the trade liberalization events from Section 4.1 on total tax revenue. Using the event-study methodology, Figure A7 shows that the trade liberalization events led to an increase in overall tax collection, with breaks from stable pre-trends that coincide with the timing of the events.

In summary, although the identifying assumptions differ, the IV and event-studies yield consistent results showing that trade causes an increase in capital (and labor) taxation in LMICs, which results in an overall positive impact of openness on total tax collection. Our emphasis on direct domestic taxes leads to a comprehensive analysis of trade's impact on tax systems in developing countries, with findings that run somewhat counter to a dominant revenue-concern amongst policy-makers.

In the next section, we investigate mechanisms for trade's impact on ETR .

5 Mechanisms

5.1 Outlining the tax capacity mechanism

The *tax capacity* mechanism is rooted in the notion that developing countries face constraints in their capacity to collect more taxes due to imperfect enforcement. We focus on corporations, where the presence of information trails increases enforceability (Section 1.1). This enables governments to collect higher taxes on corporate profits compared to non-corporate activities with less information coverage. The role of corporations can be seen in the following decomposition of ETR^K (in a given country-year):

$$ETR^K = \int_{i \in C} ETR_i^K f(i) di + \int_{i \in NC} ETR_i^K f(i) di \quad (6)$$

$$= \mu_C^K \cdot \overline{ETR}_C^K + (1 - \mu_C^K) \cdot \overline{ETR}_{NC}^K \quad (7)$$

where μ_C^K is the corporate share of (capital) national income of agents i with density $f(i)$, and \overline{ETR}_C^K and \overline{ETR}_{NC}^K are the average effective tax rates on capital in the corporate (C) and non-corporate (NC) sectors, respectively. In national accounts,

\overline{ETR}_C^K corresponds to the average effective tax rate on corporate profits.¹⁸ Suggestive of improved enforceability, \overline{ETR}_C^K is on average 50% larger than the overall ETR^K in developing countries (19.9% versus 13.3%). The tax-capacity hypothesis predicts that a rise in the corporate share (μ_C) causes an increase in overall ETR^K .

How can trade openness impact μ_C , the corporate share of national income? A robust prediction from a large class of models is that trade leads to the expansion of large firms relative to small ones (Mrázová & Neary, 2018). Since small firms in developing countries are often informal and formality rises with firm-size (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014), this trade-induced expansion increases the national income share of firms that are more likely to be formal and incorporated. This expansion may occur through two distinct channels (Dix-Carneiro, Goldberg, Meghir, & Ulyssea, 2021). First, trade openness can lead to increased market opportunities that disproportionately benefit large exporters (Melitz, 2003), causing an increase in the market income-share of firms that are initially larger and likely to be corporations (McCaig & Pavcnik, 2018). Second, trade can expand the availability of intermediate goods and lower their prices, which may also disproportionately benefit initially larger firms (for example due to fixed costs as in Kugler & Verhoogen, 2009), and similarly cause an increase in the income-share of formal and incorporated firms.

The tax-capacity hypothesis is not confined to a prediction between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. Openness may also disproportionately benefit the larger firms inside the corporate sector: trade would then cause \overline{ETR}_C^K to rise if initially larger corporate firms have higher ETR_i^K (as in Bachas, Brockmeyer, & Semelet, 2020). Finally, we note that the predictions for μ_C and \overline{ETR}_C^K would hold if, rather than disproportionately accruing to initially larger firms, the benefits of trade lead to more uniform growth for firms of different initial sizes.¹⁹

¹⁸ \overline{ETR}_{NC}^K is the average effective tax rate on an admittedly heterogeneous group of non-corporate agents i in the economy, which includes capital taxes on self-employed and taxes on property and individual wealth. Moreover, our database does not permit a systematic breakdown between these tax-types within the NC -sector. These limitations motivate our empirical focus on μ_C and \overline{ETR}_C^K , which are well-defined in national accounts and can be consistently measured.

¹⁹If the growth occurs over portions of the size distribution where the likelihood of incorporating and ETR_i^K increase with size. Uniform trade-benefits may arise if the foreign inputs are widely accessible and encourage all firms to become more productive (Nataraj, 2011). Some unincorporated firms would grow sufficiently in size that they decide to incorporate (increasing μ_C), while initially incorporated firms would grow in size and become more enforceable (increasing \overline{ETR}_C^K).

Trends in corporate sector share To gauge this novel mechanism’s plausibility, Figure 6 plots the evolution since 1965 of the share of domestic product that originates from the corporate sector μ_C (sum of corporate profits and employee compensation). We observe a sizeable uptick in the corporate-share in LMICs in the mid-1990s, from 55% to 65%, which coincides with trade liberalization and the rise in ETR^K . Meanwhile, the share of mixed income (i.e., income of self-employed individuals and unincorporated businesses) sharply falls around that time, consistent with an expansion of formal income relative to informal activities. Thus, since the 1990s, a growing fraction of output is produced in corporations in LMICs and the timing of this rise suggests that it could be linked to trade liberalization. In HICs, μ_C has been stable around 70% since the 1970s.

5.2 Main results on mechanism outcomes

We investigate the tax capacity mechanism, as well as the ‘race to bottom’ and ‘social insurance’ mechanisms (Section 1.1), in developing countries. Table 3 shows OLS in Panel A and IV in Panel B. Consistent with race-to-bottom, in column (1) trade causes a decrease in the statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate (significant at 10% in the IV).²⁰ Columns (2)-(5) analyze the effect of trade on components of national income. We find that trade causes a significant increase in the corporate share of national income (μ_C), and a significant reduction of equivalent magnitude in mixed income. This result is consistent with the tax capacity mechanism, whereby trade disproportionately benefits larger firms and causes an expansion of market income in more productive, formal firms relative to smaller, informal firms. In column (6), we find trade increases the corporate average effective tax rate \overline{ETR}_C^K , consistent with the tax capacity mechanism also operating within the corporate sector.

Table 3 shows that the corporate sector rise is driven by an increase in capital corporate income (corporate profits), while the growth in labor corporate income (employee compensation) is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.²¹ These results suggest that trade’s expansion of income in the corporate sector in

²⁰The outcome is the first-differenced tax rate (Romer & Romer, 2010). Table A4 shows results with the level of the CIT rate. We combine data from Végh and Vuletin (2015), Egger et al. (2019), Tax Foundation (link) and country-specific sources. It would be interesting in future work to connect our results on statutory and effective tax rate changes to the literature on fiscal policy cyclicity in developing countries (Ilzetzki & Végh, 2008; Végh & Vuletin, 2015).

²¹There is a null effect of trade on households’ operating surplus OS_{HH} (result not shown).

practice benefits capital more than labor. Consistent with this, in columns (7)-(8), we find that trade causes an increase in the capital-share, both of national income and inside the corporate sector. This may occur if rising mark-ups is one of the main ways through which the corporate sector's income share grows.²² It may also occur if trade benefits more capital-intensive production in developing countries.

Table A4 shows the mechanism results are robust to several checks: using NDP representative weights; including different controls; winsorizing the trade variable; and, estimating IVs separately based on each instrument. The CIT rate result remains less robust than the other mechanism results in these checks.

Finally, Figure A7 shows the same mechanism-outcomes but using the event-study design (Section 4.1). Relative to stable-trends, the trade-liberalization events led to: a decrease in the CIT rate; an expansion of corporate income at the expense of mixed income; an increase in \overline{ETR}_C^K ; and, a rise in capital-share. Though based on different identifying variation in openness, these event-study mechanism results are consistent with the IV results from Table 3 (albeit less precisely estimated).

5.3 Heterogeneity: Developing vs developed countries

We expand our sample to high-income countries to test if trade's mechanisms and ultimate impacts on $ETRs$ differ across development levels – such that trade openness may have contributed to the divergent trends in ETR_K between HICs and LMICs seen in Figure 1. We conjecture that the tax capacity mechanism is unlikely to operate in HICs if enforcement constraints are not as binding in these countries over our sample-period (e.g. Figure 6 showed that the corporate share of output has been stable in HICs over the past 40 years). In contrast, both the race-to-bottom and social insurance mechanisms are likely to be present in HICs countries, given previous research. We take advantage of having two instruments to estimate heterogeneous IV effects by development level, by including an interaction term between trade openness and a high-income country dummy:

$$y_{ct} = \mu \cdot trade_{ct} + \kappa \cdot trade_{ct} \cdot \mathbb{1}(HighIncome)_c + \Theta \cdot X_{ct} + \pi_c + \pi_t + \epsilon_{ct} \quad (8)$$

²²De Loecker and Eeckhout (2021) find that mark-ups have risen in most regions around the world over the past 40 years. Recent empirical studies of mark-ups and international trade in LMICs include De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) and Goldberg (2023). The strong increase in corporate profits, and limited change in employee compensation, may also arise if trade increases corporate firms' labor market power (Felix, 2022).

To increase comparability, the IV uses NDP weights so the regression results are representative similarly to the descriptive trends in Figure 1. The IV estimates in the full sample of countries are reported in Table 4, with the 1st-stage regression in Table A3. The Kleibergen-Paap 1st-stage F-statistic is 14.39.²³

Column (1) of Table 4 reveals clear heterogeneity: openness causes ETR_K to increase in LMICs but to decrease in HICs.²⁴ The coefficient for HICs is not statistically significant, however. Column (2) reveals a positive effect of trade openness on ETR_L everywhere, but the magnitude of the increase is (slightly) larger in HICs than in LMICs. Column (3) shows that the race-to-bottom effect is much more pronounced in HICs, which might have contributed to the overall negative effect of trade on ETR_K . In the final columns, we find that the positive impacts of trade on tax capacity outcomes (corporate share of national income, \overline{ETR}_C^K) are limited to LMICs, with largely null effects in HICs. While the results in Table 4 reveal qualitative differences in the coefficients between development levels, we cannot statistically reject their equality for several outcomes.

These results are consistent with the existence of countervailing mechanisms which differ by development level. The impact of trade on ETR_K is negative in HICs due to the race-to-bottom, but this force is counteracted by increased tax capacity in LMICs where the net impact of trade on ETR_K is positive. Through these heterogeneous and counteracting mechanisms, trade openness can therefore rationalize the divergent long-run ETR_K trends by development level in Figure 1. The positive impact of trade on ETR_L in LMICs is likely due to tax capacity and social insurance.²⁵ The positive trade-impact on ETR_L in HICs may be due to social insurance demand and revenue compensation needs following CIT cuts.

²³With multiple endogenous regressors, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic depends on whether the instruments generate sufficiently distinct variation in the endogenous regressors. In Table A3, we also report the Sanderson-Windmeijer weak multiple instrument F-statistic. Unlike for individual endogenous regressors, effective first-stage F-statistics have not yet been developed in the case of multiple endogenous regressors (Andrews, Stock, & Sun, 2019).

²⁴The IV-coefficients for developing countries qualitatively differ between Table 4 and Tables 1 and 3 (though they are not statistically different). This is mainly because the two instruments' strength change in the 1st-stage regression in the expanded sample relative to the sample of developing countries (compare column 1 to columns 4-5 in Table A3). Moreover, the overall first-stage strength is somewhat weaker in the expanded sample, which impacts the estimated coefficients in both developing and developed countries (Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016).

²⁵Corporations serve as third-party reporters and withholding agents for employees' income, which increases the enforceability of labor income taxes on employees relative to self-employed workers.

Table A5 provides additional IV-heterogeneity results on mechanisms in the full sample of LMICs and HICs. Panel A shows that the trade-induced reduction in CIT rate is more pronounced in countries that are less populous and that have fewer capital restrictions – settings where capital flight concerns are more pronounced (Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998). Mirroring this result, Panel B shows that the large positive trade-effect on ETR_K is limited to countries that are more populous and have more capital restrictions. These results support the conjecture that the tax capacity and race-to-bottom mechanisms occur simultaneously: countries that have larger market size and that limit capital mobility are better situated to reap the positive tax capacity effects of trade.

5.4 Firm-level analysis of tax-capacity mechanism and discussion

In this subsection we provide a firm-level analysis of the tax capacity mechanism, and a discussion of how it relates to the trade-formalization literature.

Firm level analysis in Rwanda Our tax capacity mechanism derives from firm-level heterogeneity in (i) enforceability of taxes and (ii) benefits from trade openness. In this sense, a firm-level investigation of the mechanism is meaningful. However, a firm-level analysis would have to account for network linkages, given the evidence on both the existence of domestic firm-transaction linkages in developing countries (e.g. Almunia, Hjort, Knebelmann, & Tian, 2023) and the role of these linkages in propagating trade-shocks to domestic firms that transact with importing and exporting firms (Fieler, Eslava, & Xu, 2018; Javorcik, 2004). In our mechanism, there may be indirect impacts on market-shares of domestic firms through their linkages with firms that are directly impacted by trade.

In Appendix E.1 we implement a firm-level analysis in Rwanda, by merging several administrative micro-datasets. These merged data allow us to measure each formal firm’s direct imports as well as the domestic transaction linkages between all formal firms in the country. To measure a firm’s total trade exposure in a network setting, we follow the methodology in Dhyne, Kikkawa, Mogstad, and Tintelnot (2021) who use similar data-sets to measure Belgian firms’ individual exposure to trade. The data reveals that while under 30% of firms import directly, 93% of Rwandan firms obtain foreign inputs either directly or indirectly through domestic

suppliers that use imports in their production process. Thus, most formal firms in Rwanda are dependent on imports, but a significant share of this dependence comes from the domestic linkages to directly-importing firms. The share of input costs spent on goods that are imported directly or indirectly (our measure of total import trade exposure) is 48% for the median formal Rwandan firm.

We analyze the impact of a formal firm's total trade exposure on its corporate effective tax rate, corresponding to corporate ETR_i^K in equation (6). We use both OLS and IV in firm-level panel regressions. The IV strategy generates firm-level variation in trade exposure through the shift-share design from [Hummels et al. \(2014\)](#): the identifying variation is trade shocks from changes in world export supply of specific country-product combinations in which a Rwandan firm had a previous import relationship. We find that both direct trade shocks to a firm's own imports and indirect shocks to a firm's network of suppliers cause significant changes to the firm's total trade exposure, generating a strong 1st-stage. Using the IV, we find that higher exposure to trade causes an increase in the individual firm's ETR_i^K . The IV also reveals that trade increases firm size (proxied by sales), while the OLS shows a positive association between firm size and ETR_i^K . These results are consistent with the tax-capacity mechanism, where enforceability increases in firm size and trade's positive impact on ETR^K is mediated by its effect on size.

This firm-level exercise comes with two caveats. First, the network linkage measures are derived from administrative data which, by construction, only exist for tax registered firms. This sample restriction, which is common to network studies in developing countries ([Atkin & Khandelwal, 2020](#)), implies that the firm-level regression will only capture trade's impact on corporate ETR^K between firms within the formal sector, which omits the important re-allocation channel from the informal sector that also impacts overall ETR^K (equation 6). Second, estimation strategies within country deliver relative impacts and by design cannot speak to the net impacts of trade on formality. Recent theoretical work by [Dix-Carneiro et al. \(2021\)](#) highlights how trade's relative impacts (in partial equilibrium) and net impacts (in full equilibrium) may differ, due to interactions between labor markets and firms' output-markets and sectoral and geographical re-allocations. For these reasons, we consider the Rwandan firm-analysis to be complementary to the country-level analysis (Tables 1-4) which estimates the economy-wide net impacts of trade openness on effective taxation and output formalization.

Discussion: Links to trade-formality literature We find positive effects of trade on outcomes linked to formalization. Recent trade studies²⁶ have focused on the number of formal versus informal firms, formal versus informal workers or formal worker wages and found mixed evidence that trade liberalization increases formality by these measures (see reviews in Engel & Kokas, 2021; Ulyssea, 2020). One way to reconcile our results with the literature is to note that our focus is on the share of output produced in formal versus informal firms: the expansion of output in larger, formal firms may occur without significant changes to the number of formal or informal firms, and does not necessarily imply an increase in the number of formal workers, since informal workers may work in formal firms and contribute to their output (Ulyssea, 2018).

Moreover, trade models highlight that formality-impacts depend on the nature of the trade shock. To further investigate our mechanism, we therefore study in Appendix E.2 if the ETR and mechanism impacts differ along two dimensions of trade shocks (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2021). First, increased *exports* represent a pure positive demand shock for export-oriented firms, while increased *imports* may constitute a negative demand shock for domestic firms, disproportionately affecting larger ones. Through these simplified ‘Melitz-type’ demand-effects, exports may increase the formal output-share while imports may decrease it. Second, the increased availability of *intermediate* goods may benefit initially larger firms; by contrast, the increased availability of *final* goods may constitute a negative domestic demand shock, particularly for larger, formal firms. Through these simplified effects, concentrated on the import side, trade in intermediate goods-services (G-S) may raise the formal share of output while trade in final G-S may reduce it.

Using our two instruments in LMICs, Table E2 shows that exports increase ETR_K while imports decrease it. In a separate IV, trade in intermediate G-S increases ETR_K while trade in final G-S decreases it. Moreover, exports increase the corporate income-share, while imports decrease it; trade in intermediate G-S increases the corporate income-share while final G-S trade decreases it. Taken together, the coefficients are consistent with imports of intermediate G-S increasing formality, and imports of final G-S decreasing it. These results suggest that the tax-capacity impacts on formality and ETR depend on the nature of the trade shock.

²⁶Including Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Bosch et al. (2012), Cruces et al. (2018), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019), and Ponzcek and Ulyssea (2022).

5.5 Capital openness

We complete the analysis by noting that our focus throughout the paper has been on one key dimension of globalization: trade openness. Given our interest in capital taxation, another relevant dimension is capital openness (Ilzetzi, Reinhart, & Rogoff, 2019; Van Patten, 2022). However, due to differences in countries' reporting requirements, data on capital openness is not as available and comparable as trade data. Finding credible exogenous variation for capital openness is also challenging.

Notwithstanding these challenges, in Appendix F we try to investigate the impact of capital openness on ETR . We rely on the capital inflow liberalization events for 25 developing countries from Chari, Henry, and Sasson (2012), which capture the first time when foreign investment in the domestic stock market is allowed. Employing the same event-study design as Section 4, we find that the events lead to both increased capital openness and higher ETR_K , qualitatively consistent with the trade-liberalization results. This suggests that the positive impact of globalization on ETR_K in developing countries may be robust to using capital instead of trade openness. However, given the limitations with the measurement of capital flows, we consider that our results based on trade provide more meaningful and robust insights into globalization's impacts on effective taxation.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide evidence on trends and causal effects of globalization on tax structures. We make two main contributions. The first is to build and analyze a global macro-historical database of effective tax rates on labor and capital covering 155 countries with over half starting in 1965. The main novel fact is the asymmetric evolution of capital taxation by development level in the era of hyper-globalization: while the effective tax rate has fallen in developed countries, it has strongly risen in developing countries since the 1990s. Our second contribution is to formulate and test a new hypothesis that sheds light on this asymmetric evolution. Across multiple research designs, we find evidence of a pro-tax capacity effect of international trade: openness causes a rise in effective capital (and labor) taxation, by expanding larger, formal firms relative to smaller, informal firms, and concentrating economic activity in corporations where tax enforcement is stronger. The pro-tax

capacity effect prevails in developing countries, while the well-known negative race-to-bottom effect on capital taxation has dominated in developed countries.

This paper's findings have implications for public finance and globalization in developing countries. By relieving enforcement constraints and positively impacting domestic direct taxes, trade openness causes an increase in overall taxation. This result runs counter to a persistent policy-concern over tax losses from trade liberalization, while previous academic work has mainly abstracted from investigating trade impacts on domestic capital and labor taxes. By incorporating these direct tax bases, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the revenue consequences of globalization. Our paper focuses on a specific enforcement mechanism, but many links remain to be explored between trade, firm structure, and tax collection.

Moreover, across our research designs we find that the positive effect of trade is larger for capital than for labor taxation in developing countries. As capital income is more concentrated than labor income, this result is a first step towards understanding whether trade-induced changes in taxation have attenuated rather than reinforced the distributional effects of globalization on pre-tax income in LMICs. While we adopted a macro perspective on tax systems and inequality, a next step could be to combine our effective tax rates with individual-level estimates of the progressivity of labor and capital taxes. This would allow a comparison of the distributional effects of globalization on pre-tax versus post-tax income distributions.

References

- Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 105(490).
- Adam, A., Kammas, P., & Rodriguez, A. L. (2013). The effect of globalization on capital taxation. *Journal of Macroeconomics*, 35.
- Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (1998). Openness, country size and government. *Journal of Public Economics*, 69.
- Alfaro-Ureña, A., Manelici, I., & Vasquez, J. (2022). The effects of joining multinational supply chains: New evidence from firm-to-firm linkages. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 137(3).
- Almunia, M., Hjort, J., Knebelmann, J., & Tian, L. (2023). Strategic or confused firms? Evidence from missing transactions in Uganda. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, forthcoming.
- Andrews, I., Stock, J., & Sun, L. (2019). Weak instruments in IV regression: Theory and evidence. *Annual Review of Economics*, 11.


- Atkin, D., & Khandelwal, A. (2020). How distortions alter the impacts of international trade in developing countries. *Annual Review of Economics*, 12.
- Bachas, P., Brockmeyer, A., & Semelet, C. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 on formal firms: Micro tax data simulations across countries. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (9437).
- Basri, M. C., Felix, M., Hanna, R., & Olken, B. (2021). Tax administration versus tax rates: Evidence from corporate taxation in Indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 111(12).
- Baunsgaard, T., & Keen, M. (2009). Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(9).
- Benzarti, Y., & Tazhitdinova, A. (2021). Do value-added taxes affect international trade flows? Evidence from 30 years of tax reforms. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13(4), 469–89.
- Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014). Why do developing countries tax so little? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(4).
- Bilicka, K. A. (2019). Comparing UK tax returns of foreign multinationals to matched domestic firms. *American Economic Review*, 109(8).
- Blanchet, T., Chancel, L., Flores, I., & Morgan, M. (2021). *Distributional national accounts guidelines: Methods and concepts used in the World Inequality Database*.
- Borusyak, K., Jaravel, X., & Spiess, J. (2021). Revisiting event study designs: Robust and efficient estimation.
- Brandt, L., Biesebroeck, J. V., Wang, L., & Zhang, Y. (2017). WTO accession and performance of Chinese manufacturing firms. *American Economic Review*, 107(9).
- Buettner, T., & Madzharova, B. (2018). WTO membership and the shift to consumption taxes. *World Development*, 108(1).
- Bustos, S., & Yildirim, M. A. (2022). Production ability and economic growth. *Research Policy*, 51(8).
- Bustos, S., Pomeranz, D., Vila-Belda, J., & Zucman, G. (2019). Challenges of monitoring tax compliance by multinational firms: Evidence from Chile. *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 109.
- Cagé, J., & Gadenne, L. (2018). Tax revenues and the fiscal cost of trade liberalization, 1792-2006. *Explorations in Economic History*, 70.
- Carey, D., & Rabesona, J. (2004). Tax ratios on labor and capital income and on consumption. In P. B. Sørensen (Ed.), *Measuring the tax burden on capital and labor*. MIT Press.
- Chari, A., Henry, P., & Sasson, D. (2012). Capital market integration and wages. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 4(2).
- Chinn, M., & Ito, H. (2006). What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions. *Journal of Development Economics*, 81(1).
- Clausing, K. (2016). The effect of profit shifting on the corporate tax base in the United States and beyond. *National Tax Journal*, 69(4).

- Cogneau, D., Dupraz, Y., Knebelmann, J., & Mesplé-Somps, S. (2021). Taxation in Africa from colonial times to present. *Working Paper*.
- De Loecker, J., & Eeckhout, J. (2021). Global market power. *Working Paper*.
- De Loecker, J., Goldberg, P., Khandelwal, A., & Pavcnik, N. (2016). Prices, markups and trade reform. *Econometrica*, 84(2).
- Dhyne, E., Kikkawa, A., Mogstad, M., & Tintelnot, F. (2021). Trade and domestic production networks. *Review of Economic Studies*, 88(2).
- Dix-Carneiro, R., Goldberg, P., Meghir, C., & Ulyssea, G. (2021). Trade and informality in the presence of labor market frictions and regulations. *NBER Working Paper*.
- Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E. L., & Thornock, J. R. (2017). Changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 124(3), 441–463.
- Egger, P., Nigai, S., & Strecker, N. (2019). The taxing deed of globalization. *American Economic Review*, 109(2).
- Emran, S., & Stiglitz, J. (2005). On selective indirect tax reform in developing countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89.
- Engel, J., & Kokas, D. (2021). The distributional impacts of trade: Empirical innovations, analytical tools, and policy responses. *World Bank Working Paper*.
- Epifani, P., & Gancia, G. (2009). Openness, government size and the terms of trade. *Review of Economic Studies*, 76(2).
- Felix, M. (2022). Trade, labor market concentration, and wages. *Working Paper*.
- Fieler, A., Eslava, M., & Xu, D. (2018). Trade, quality upgrading and input linkages: Theory and evidence from Colombia. *American Economic Review*, 108(1).
- Fisman, R., & Wei, S.-J. (2004). Tax rates and tax evasion: Evidence from "missing imports" in China. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2).
- Garcia-Bernardo, J., Janský, P., & Tørsløv, T. (2022). Decomposing multinational corporations declining effective tax rates. *IMF Economic Review*, 70(2).
- Goldberg, P. (2023). *The unequal effects of globalization*. MIT Press.
- Goldberg, P., & Pavcnik, N. (2007). Distributional effects of globalization in developing countries. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45(1).
- Goldberg, P., & Pavcnik, N. (2016). The effects of trade policy. *NBER Working Paper Series*, (21957).
- Gollin, D. (2002). Getting income shares right. *Journal of Political Economy*, 110(2).
- Guerriero, M. (2019). The labor share of income around the world: Evidence from a panel dataset. *ADB Working Papers Series*, (920).
- Hines, J. (2006). Corporate taxation and international competition. *Ross School of Business Paper*, (1026).
- Hummels, D., Jørgensen, R., Munch, J., & Xiang, C. (2014). The wage effects of offshoring: Evidence from Danish matched worker-firm data. *American Economic Review*, 104(6).

- ILO. (2019). *The global labour income share and distribution*. International Labour Organization.
- Ilzetzi, E., Reinhart, C., & Rogoff, K. (2019). Exchange arrangements entering the twenty-first century: Which anchor will hold? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(2).
- Ilzetzi, E., & Végh, C. (2008). Procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries: Truth or fiction? *NBER Working Paper Series*, (14191).
- Javorcik, B. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? in search of spillovers through backward linkages. *American Economic Review*, 94(3).
- Javorcik, B., & Narciso, G. (2017). WTO accession and tariff evasion. *Journal of Development Economics*, 125, 59–71.
- Jensen, A. (2022). Employment structure and the rise of the modern tax system. *American Economic Review*, 112(1).
- Karabarbounis, L., & Neiman, B. (2014). The global decline of the labor share. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1).
- Keen, M., & Ligthart, J. (2002). Coordinating tariff reduction and domestic tax reform. *Journal of International Economics*, 56(2).
- Kleven, H., Kreiner, C., & Saez, E. (2016). Why can modern governments tax so much? *Economica*, 83(330).
- Kleven, H., Knudsen, M., Kreiner, C., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011). Unable or unwilling to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark. *Econometrica*, 79(3).
- Kugler, M., & Verhoogen, E. (2009). Plants and imported inputs: New facts and an interpretation. *American Economic Review*, 99(12).
- La Porta, R., & Shleifer, A. (2014). Informality and development. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28.
- Londoño-Vélez, J., & Tortarolo, D. (2022). Revealing 21% of GDP in hidden assets: Evidence from Argentina’s tax amnesties. *UNU WIDER Working Paper*, (103).
- McCaig, B., & Pavcnik, N. (2018). Export markets and labor allocation in a low-income country. *American Economic Review*, 108(7).
- McDaniel, C. (2007). Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labor and capital in the OECD 1950-2003. *Working Paper*.
- Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity. *Econometrica*, 71.
- Méndez, E., & Van Patten, D. (2022). Multinationals, monopsony, and local development. *Econometrica*, 90(6).
- Mendoza, E. G., Razin, A., & Tesar, L. L. (1994). Effective tax rates in macroeconomics. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 34(3).
- Mogstad, M., Torgovitsky, A., & Walters, C. (2021). The causal interpretation of two-stage least squares with multiple instrumental variables. *American Economic Review*, 111(11).


- Mrázová, M., & Neary, P. (2018). Selection effects with heterogeneous firms. *Journal of European Economic Association*, 17.
- Naritomi, J. (2019). Consumers as tax auditors. *American Economic Review*, 109(9).
- Nataraj, S. (2011). The impact of trade liberalization on productivity. *Journal of International Economics*, 85(2).
- Parenti, M. (2018). Large and small firms in a global market: David vs. Goliath. *Journal of International Economics*, 110.
- Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2018). Distributional national accounts. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2).
- Pomeranz, D. (2015). No taxation without information: Deterrence and self-enforcement in the value-added tax. *American Economic Review*, 105(8).
- Rodrik, D. (1997). Trade, social insurance, and the limits to globalization. *NBER Working Paper Series*, (5905).
- Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5).
- Romer, C., & Romer, D. (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: Estimates based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. *American Economic Review*, 100(1).
- Sanderson, E., & Windmeijer, F. (2016). A weak instrument F-test in linear IV models with multiple endogenous variables. *Journal of Econometrics*, 190(2).
- Ulyssea, G. (2018). Firms, informality, and development: Theory and evidence from Brazil. *American Economic Review*, 108(8).
- Ulyssea, G. (2020). Informality: Causes and consequences for development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 12.
- United Nations. (2001). *World public sector report: Globalization and the state*. United Nations Publications.
- Van Patten, D. (2022). The dismantling of capital controls after Bretton Woods and Latin American productivity. *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 112.
- Végh, C. A., & Vuletin, G. (2015). How is tax policy conducted over the business cycle? *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 7(3).
- Wacziarg, R., & Wallack, J. (2004). Trade liberalization and intersectoral labor movements. *Journal of International Economics*, 64.
- Wier, L. (2020). Tax-motivated transfer mispricing in South Africa: Direct evidence using transaction data. *Journal of Public Economics*, 184.
- World Bank. (2008). *Public finance in China: Reform and growth for a harmonious society* (J. Lou & S. Wang, Eds.). The World Bank.

Figure 1: Effective Taxation of Capital and Labor




Notes: This figure plots the time series of average effective tax rates on labor (red) and capital (blue), as well as the average effective tax rate on corporate profits (blue dashed line). The top-left panel corresponds to the global average, weighting country-year observations by their share in that year's total factor income, in constant 2019 USD ($N=155$). The bottom-left panel shows the results for high-income countries ($N=37$), and the bottom-right panel for low- and middle-income countries ($N=118$). Income classification is based on the World Bank income groups in 2018. The dataset is composed of two quasi-balanced panels. The first covers the years 1965-1993 and excludes communist regimes. It accounts for 85-90% of world GDP during those years. The second covers 1994-2018 and integrates former communist countries, in particular China and Russia, and accounts for 97-98% of world GDP. This figure is discussed in Section 3.1.

Figure 2: Robustness of Effective Capital Taxation in Developing Countries




Notes: These panels show trends in the effective tax rate on capital in the 118 developing countries in our sample. The panels vary our four key methodological choices: the allocation of personal income tax revenue to capital vs labor (panel a); the allocation of mixed income to capital vs labor (panel b); presenting results for an unbalanced panel of countries vs a balanced panel via imputations (panel c); and, the use of weights to aggregate individual countries' time-series (panel d). Panel (e) shows all 54 possible combinations that can be constructed by combining these choices. In all panels, the blue line corresponds to our benchmark series. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. This figure is discussed in Section 3.2.

Figure 3: Heterogeneity of Effective Capital Taxation in Developing Countries




Notes: These panels show the evolution of the effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K , for major developing countries and sub-samples of developing countries. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Panel (a) plots the ETR_K series for the four largest developing countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia. Panel (b) compares our benchmark series to: a series without China; a series without oil-rich countries (countries with more than 7% of GDP from oil in 2018); and, a series without China and oil-rich countries. Within the sample of non-oil rich developing countries, panel (c) compares large countries to small countries. Large countries are defined as having a population above 40 million in 2018. This figure is discussed in Section 3.3.

Figure 4: Within-Country Associations between Effective Tax Rates and Trade




Notes: These panels show the association between trade and effective tax rates. The outcome is the effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K , and on labor, ETR_L , in the left-side and right-side panels, respectively. The top panels show the associations in all countries; the middle panels show the associations in high-income countries (based on World Bank income classification in 2018); the bottom panels show the associations in low and middle-income countries. Trade is measured as the sum of import and exports as a share of net domestic product. Both the x-axis and y-axis are measured as within-country percent changes over 5 years. Each graph shows binned scatter plots of each outcome against trade, after residualizing all variables against year fixed effects. Each dot corresponds to a ventile (20 equal-sized bins) of the residualized trade variable, with average values of trade and ETR calculated by ventile. In each graph, the line represents the best linear fit based on the underlying country-year data, with the corresponding slope-coefficient and standard error reported in the top-left corner. For more details, see Section 3.4.

Figure 5: Event Study of Trade Liberalization Reforms



Notes: These figures show event-studies for trade liberalization in seven large developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Mexico and Vietnam. The panels correspond to different outcomes: trade (top panels); effective tax rate on capital (middle panels); effective tax rate on labor (bottom panels). The left-side graphs show the average level of the outcome in every year to/since the event for the treated group and for the group of synthetic control countries. The right-hand graphs show the β_e coefficients on the to/since dummies, based on estimating the dynamic event-study regression in equation (4). The bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country-reform level and estimated with the wild bootstrap method. The top-left corners report the F-statistic on the joint significance of the post-event dummies, with the p-value in parentheses. Details on methodology in Section 4.1.1.

Figure 6: Corporate Sector Income and Mixed Income, by Development Level



Notes: These panels plot the time series of corporate sector income and of mixed income between 1965 and 2018 and by level of development. Both outcomes are expressed as a percent of net domestic product and weighted by country-year net domestic product in constant 2019 USD. Corporate income is the sum of corporate profits and corporate employee compensation. The left panels show the results for high-income countries ($N=37$), and the right panels show the results for low- and middle-income countries ($N=118$), based on the World Bank income classification in 2018. The dataset is composed of two quasi-balanced panels. The first covers the years 1965-1993 and excludes communist regimes. The second covers 1994-2018 and integrates former communist countries, in particular China and Russia. For more details, see Section 5.

Table 1: Trade Impacts on Effective Taxation of Capital and Labor in Developing Countries

	Benchmark		Robustness: Specification and covariates					Robustness: $K - L$ assignment to taxes and factor shares			Robustness: Individual instruments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: ETR_K												
Trade	0.032*** (0.010)	0.109*** (0.033)	0.118*** (0.041)	0.222* (0.120)	0.106** (0.046)	0.102*** (0.033)	0.115*** (0.032)	0.100** (0.039)	0.116*** (0.039)	0.124*** (0.042)	0.108*** (0.034)	0.164* (0.087)
Panel B: ETR_L												
Trade	0.011** (0.004)	0.056*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.015)	0.062 (0.042)	0.046** (0.020)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.053*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.015)	0.054*** (0.016)	0.140** (0.061)
Specification	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
1 st stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic		24.57	24.57	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	24.57	24.57	24.57	45.17	10.80
Modifications to IV in col. (2)			No ETR winsorize	NDP weights	Include country-year controls	Include 1(oil-rich)*year fixed effects	Winsorize trade	Assign based on corp. K -share	Assign 0% of PIT to capital	Assign 30% of PIT to capital	Only use $Z_{gravity}$ instrument	Only use $Z_{Oil-Dist}$ instrument
N	4970	4970	4970	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970

Notes: This table presents results from estimating the effect of trade on effective tax rates in developing countries. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. The outcome is the effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K , in Panel A and the effective tax rate on labor, ETR_L , in Panel B. Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by net domestic product (NDP). Column (1) presents the OLS results from estimating equation (5). All other columns use IV; at the bottom of each column, we report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The benchmark IV specification is in column (2), with the corresponding 1st-stage regression reported in Table A3. The remaining columns modify the benchmark specification of column (2). In column (3), the outcome is non-winsorized, while in column (4) we include country-year NDP weights. In column (5), we include the country-year controls described in Section 4.2.1. In column (6), we include interactive fixed effects between a dummy for oil-rich countries and year dummies. Oil-rich countries derive more than 7% of GDP from oil in 2018. In column (7), we use the trade variable which is winsorized at the 5%-95% percentile on a yearly basis. In column (8), we modify the assignment rule for factor tax rates, by using the capital share in the corporate sector as the assignment for the capital share of mixed income. In columns (9)-(10), we assign respectively 0% and 30% of personal income taxes (PIT) to capital taxes. In columns (11)-(12), we estimate the IV using the individual instruments $Z_{gravity}$ and $Z_{oil-distance}$, respectively. For more details, see Section 4.2. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Table 2: Trade Impacts on Types of Taxes (% of NDP) in Developing Countries

	Total taxes (1)	CIT (2)	Property and Wealth (3)	PIT (4)	Social Security (5)	Indirect (6)
Panel A: OLS						
Trade	0.033*** (0.011)	0.018*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.009 (0.006)
Panel B: IV						
Trade	0.098*** (0.033)	0.047*** (0.013)	0.004 (0.003)	0.010* (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)	0.019 (0.022)
1 st -stage Kleibergen- Papp F-statistic	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57
N	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970

Notes: This table shows the impacts of trade on collection of types of taxes, expressed as percent of net domestic product (NDP), in developing countries. OLS results are in panel A and IV results are in panel B. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by NDP. All regressions in panel B are based on the IV model described in Section 4.2. At the bottom of each column, we report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The corresponding 1st-stage regression is reported in Table A3. The outcome differs across columns: Column (1) is total taxes, which is the sum of direct taxes on capital and labor and indirect taxes on trade and domestic consumption; column (2) is corporate income taxes (CIT); column (3) is taxes on property, wealth and inheritance; column (4) is personal income taxes (PIT); column (5) is social security and payroll; column (6) is indirect taxes, which combines trade taxes and domestic consumption taxes. For more details on these types of taxes, see Table B2 and Appendix B.1. For more details on the IV, see Section 4.2. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Table 3: Trade Impacts on Mechanism Outcomes in Developing Countries

	First-diff. CIT rate (1)	National income components				Corporate ETR_K (6)	Factor shares	
		Corporate totl. income (2)	Household mixed income (3)	Corporate profits (4)	Employee compensation (5)		Capital share natl. income (7)	Capital share corp. sector (8)
Panel A: OLS								
Trade	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.040*** (0.013)	-0.017 (0.011)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	0.063*** (0.019)	0.021** (0.008)	0.031** (0.012)
Panel B: IV								
Trade	-0.012* (0.006)	0.183*** (0.043)	-0.193*** (0.041)	0.184*** (0.036)	0.014 (0.032)	0.142* (0.074)	0.161*** (0.034)	0.206*** (0.048)
1 st stage Kleibergen- Paap F-Statistic	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57	24.57
N	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970

Notes: This table presents results from estimating the effects of trade on mechanism outcomes in developing countries. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by net domestic product (NDP). Panel A presents OLS results and Panel B presents the IV results, based on the instruments described in Section 4.2. At the bottom of each column in Panel B, we report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. Across the columns, the outcome differs: column (1) is the first-differenced statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate; column (2) is the corporate income share of net domestic product, where corporate income is the sum of corporate profits and corporate employee compensation; column (3) is the mixed income share of net domestic product; column (4) is the corporate profit share of net domestic product; column (5) is the employee compensation share of net domestic product; column (6) is the average effective tax rate on corporate profits; column (7) is the capital share of net domestic product; column (8) is the capital share of corporate income. For sake of space, we omit showing the insignificant impact of trade on OS_{HH} , the remaining component of national income. For more details on the outcomes, see Section 2.1 and Section 5.1. For more details on the instrumental variables, see Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Table 4: Heterogeneous Impacts of Trade by Development Level


	ETR_K	ETR_L	First- diff. CIT Rate	Corp. Totl. Income	Mixed Income	Corp. Profits	Employee Comp.	Corp. ETR_K	Natl. K - Share	Corp. K - Share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade	0.267** (0.134)	0.123** (0.050)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.340** (0.133)	-0.200* (0.116)	0.211*** (0.057)	0.088 (0.098)	0.341** (0.134)	0.132*** (0.048)	0.167*** (0.051)
Trade*1(High-inc.)	-0.315 (0.231)	0.012 (0.110)	-0.070** (0.032)	-0.545*** (0.174)	0.340** (0.141)	-0.333*** (0.103)	-0.239** (0.116)	-0.142 (0.261)	-0.194** (0.076)	-0.238** (0.095)
Implied coef. for Trade in High-inc.	-0.047 (0.134)	0.135 (0.090)	-0.085*** (0.020)	-0.204 (0.141)	0.140 (0.135)	-0.121* (0.071)	-0.150 (0.125)	0.198 (0.156)	-0.061 (0.055)	-0.071 (0.077)
1 st -stage Kleibergen- Papp F-statistic	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39	14.39
N	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544	6544

Notes: This table presents IV results from estimating the effects of trade on ETR and mechanism outcomes in the full sample of developing and developed countries. Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by net domestic product (NDP). We estimate the IV described in equation 8. The first-stage regression is reported in Table A3. At the bottom of each column, we report the implied coefficient and estimated standard error based on the linear combination of the $Trade$ and the $Trade * 1(High-inc.)$ coefficients. High-income is based on the World Bank income classification in 2018. We also report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. Across the columns, the outcome differs: column (1) is the effective tax rate on capital; column (2) is the effective tax rate on labor; column (3) is the first-differenced statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate; column (4) is the corporate income share of net domestic product, where corporate income is the sum of corporate profits and corporate employee compensation; column (5) is the mixed income share of net domestic product; column (6) is the corporate profit share of net domestic product; column (7) is the employee compensation share of net domestic product; column (8) is the average effective tax rate on corporate profits; column (9) is the capital share of net domestic product; column (10) is the capital share of corporate income. For more details on the outcomes, see Section 2.1 and Section 5.1. For more details on the instrumental variables, see Section 4.2. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Appendix


Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Data Coverage of Effective Tax Rates




Notes: These panels show the coverage of our effective tax rate data between 1965 and 2018 at the global level (top left panel), in high income countries (bottom left panel), and in low- and middle-income countries (bottom right panel). Low, middle and high-income countries are based on the World Bank income classification in 2018. The solid lines plot the percentage of total population and GDP that is covered in our data (left axis). The dashed lines show the number of countries in the data (right axis). The dataset is composed of two quasi-balanced panels. The first covers the years 1965-1993 and excludes communist regimes. The second covers 1994-2018 and integrates former communist countries, in particular China and Russia. See Section 2.3 for more details.

Figure A2: Robustness of ETR_K and ETR_L Trends by Development Levels




Notes: These panels show trends in the effective taxation of capital and labor for high-income countries (HICs, top panels) and low and middle-income countries (LMICs, bottom panels). Low, middle and high-income countries are based on the World Bank income classification in 2018. The benchmark series are denoted by the thick colored lines and the grey lines denote all 54 possible permutations of the series when varying the four key methodological choices (detailed in Section 3.2): the allocation of personal income tax revenue to capital vs labor; the allocation of mixed income to capital vs labor; presenting results for an unbalanced panel of countries vs a balanced panel via imputations; and, how to weight individual countries' series when aggregating them. Panel (c) corresponding to the ETR_K for low and middle-income countries is further decomposed in Figure 2.

Figure A3: Trends by Initial Trade Openness in Developing Countries




Notes: These panels plot the time series of trade openness (top-left panel), effective tax rate on capital (bottom-left panel) and effective tax rate on labor (bottom-right panel). The sample is limited to low- and middle-income countries, according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Within each panel, the orange line (green line) traces the evolution of the group which had relatively high (low) trade openness prior to 1995. Specifically, high (low) trade openness is defined as having average trade openness which lies above (below) the global average between 1965 and 1995. Trade openness is measured as the share of imports and exports in national domestic product; note that this share can exceed a value of 1. Each line plots the year fixed effects from an OLS regression in the relevant sub-sample of the outcome on country and year fixed effects. The inclusion of country fixed effects limits the influence of countries entering and leaving the sample. The fixed effects are normalized to equal the level of the outcome variable in the relevant sub-sample in 1965. The shaded area highlights the notable 1990-1995 period, which marks the beginning of the ‘second wave’ of globalization that featured a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (Egger, Nigai, & Strecker, 2019).

Figure A4: Strength of Individual Instruments Across Subsamples




Notes: These figures show the statistical strength of the instruments $Z^{oil-distance}$ and $Z^{gravity}$ in developing countries (low and middle-income countries based on World Bank classification in 2018, $N = 4970$). The outcome is the first-stage F-statistic from a regression of trade openness on each individual instrument, in subsamples of log NDP per capita (panel a) and years (panel b). The x-axis variable is partitioned into ten deciles, and the estimation is done in increments of one decile with a bandwidth of one additional decile of on either side. To maintain equal sample sizes, estimation centered on the first and the tenth decile are dropped. More details in Section 4.2.

Figure A5: Robustness of Trade Liberalization to Changing Events-Sample




Notes: These figures show event study impacts of trade liberalization on the effective tax rate on capital (panel a) and the effective tax rate on labor (panel b). The solid green line displays the dynamic event-study coefficients β_e estimated in the full sample of 7 liberalization event-countries (Figure 5); the gray lines present the event-study coefficients estimated in samples that remove one event-country one at a time. More details in Section 4.1.1.

Figure A6: Trade Event Studies, Simultaneous Matching on Outcomes



Notes: These panels show event-studies for trade liberalization reforms in seven countries, over three outcomes: trade as a percent of net domestic product (top panels); effective tax rate on capital (middle panels); effective tax rate on labor (bottom panels). These panels are constructed similarly to Figure 5, with the exception that the synthetic control for each event-country is based on matching simultaneously on all outcomes. The left-hand graphs show the average level of the outcome in every year relative to the event, for the treated group and for the group of synthetic controls. The right-hand graphs show the β_e coefficients on the to/since dummies, based on estimating the dynamic event-study regression in equation (4). The bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for to/since event coefficients, while standard errors are clustered at the country-event level and estimated using the wild bootstrap method. In the top-left corner, we report the F-statistic on joint significance of the post-event dummies, with the p-value in parentheses.

Figure A7: Mechanism Impacts in Trade Liberalization Event Studies



Notes: These panels show the impacts of the trade liberalization events on total taxes collected and mechanism outcomes. The panels are constructed using the method in Section 4.1, and similarly to Figure 5. Across panels, the outcome differs: panel a) is total tax revenue, as a percent of net domestic product (NDP); panel b) is the first-differenced statutory corporate income tax rate; panel c) is the corporate income share of net domestic product, where corporate income is the sum of corporate profits and employee compensation; panel d) is the mixed income share of net domestic product; panel e) is the average effective tax rate on corporate profits; panel f) is the capital share of net domestic product. In each panel, the top-left corner reports the F-statistic for the joint significance of post-event dummies, with the p-value reported in parentheses.

Table A1: Weights in Synthetic Control for Trade Liberalization Events

Treated Country	Event Year	Trade Openness	Weight	ETR_K	Weight	ETR_L	Weight	Reference
Argentina	1989	Bangladesh	97.3	% Bangladesh	41.6 %	Chile	35.9 %	Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006)
		United States	2.7 %	Haiti	14.1 %	Togo	31.6 %	
		.	.	Bolivia	13.4 %	Jordan	16.8 %	
		
Brazil	1988	Bangladesh	59.8 %	Jordan	35.7 %	Panama	25.7 %	Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017)
		United States	32.2	% Sudan	21.2 %	Guyana	21.7 %	
		Japan	6.1 %	Zimbabwe	12.7 %	Chile	14.5 %	
		
China	2001	United States	36.2 %	Congo	41.8 %	Kuwait	31.1 %	Brandt et al. (2017)
		Bangladesh	36.0 %	Nicaragua	26.3 %	Pakistan	22.9 %	
		Dominican Rep.	12.2 %	Gabon	14.2 %	Uganda	20.2 %	
		
Colombia	1985	Bangladesh	50.7 %	Kuwait	67.9 %	Paraguay	45.5 %	Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006; 2016)
		Iran	22.6 %	Gabon	14.6 %	Sudan	15.0 %	
		Guatemala	12.5 %	Sierra Leone	12.6 %	Cameroon	11.5 %	
		
India	1991	United States	76.4 %	Uganda	41.4 %	Lebanon	37.9 %	Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006, 2016); Topalova et al. (2009)
		Bangladesh	23.6 %	Bolivia	14.0 %	Oman	17.6 %	
		.	.	Haiti	4.6 %	Jordan	16.2 %	
		
Mexico	1985	Bangladesh	72.0 %	Sierra Leone	33.2 %	Tunisia	31.1	Feenstra and Hanson (1997); Goldberg and Pavcnik (2006, 2016)
		Uruguay	9.6 %	Bahrain	23.6 %	Zimbabwe	25.8 %	
		Spain	8.0 %	Bolivia	14.7 %	Uruguay	15.9 %	
		
Vietnam	2001	Thailand	42.4 %	Korea	45.8 %	Bangladesh	72.8 %	Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016), McCaig and Pavcnik (2018)
		Ghana	22.6 %	Luxembourg	19.2 %	Myanmar	22.6 %	
		Venezuela	21.7 %	Trinidad & Tob.	17.3 %	Haiti	4.6 %	
		

Notes: This table shows the seven treated countries and the three countries with the largest weight in the synthetic control group for each treated country and outcome (trade openness, ETR_K , ETR_L). For each outcome, the pool of possible donor countries consists of all non-treated countries with a balanced panel over all the pre-event periods that are used in the matching procedure.

Table A2: Synthetic Difference-in-Difference of Trade Liberalization

	Trade	ETR_K	ETR_L
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: <i>Synthetic control for each outcome separately</i>			
Post*Treat	0.064 (0.047)	0.0457*** (0.015)	0.020** (0.009)
Imputed treatment effect	0.070* (0.039)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.020*** (0.005)
Panel B: <i>Synthetic control for all outcomes jointly</i>			
Post*Treat	0.092* (0.044)	0.033* (0.016)	0.012 (0.008)
Imputed treatment effect	0.101*** (0.028)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.012*** (0.004)
N	294	294	294

Notes: This table shows the results from the difference in differences regression. The outcome varies across columns: trade (sum of imports and exports divided by net domestic product); effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K ; effective tax rate on labor, ETR_L . For each outcome, the sample is the 7 event-countries and the 7 synthetic control countries in the 21 event-periods from 10 years since to 10 years after the event. Panel A shows the results when the synthetic control matching is done for each event-country and outcome separately. Panel B shows the results when the synthetic control matching is done jointly on all outcomes (but still separately for each event-country). In practice we run the following regression:

$$y_{ct} = \beta^{DiD} * \mathbb{1}(e \geq 0)_t * D_c + \theta_t + \kappa_c + \pi_{Year(ct)} + \epsilon_{ct}$$

where β^{DiD} is the Post*Treat difference-in-differences coefficient, with e the relative event-time and D_c a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all treated event-countries (and a value of 0 in all synthetic control countries). In each panel, we also report the difference-in-differences imputed treatment effect based on [Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess, 2021](#). This effect is imputed by first estimating country and time fixed effects, using non-treated countries as well as treated countries before their event. Those unit and year specific estimates are then used to impute the treatment effect for every treated country, and the reported coefficient is then the average of the individual treatment effects. Due to the small sample size, we present wild bootstrap standard errors in parentheses except for the imputed treatment effect, where we report the default standard errors produced by the Stata command `did_iputation`. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

Table A3: First-Stage and Reduced Form Regressions

	1 st -stage	Reduced form		1 st -stage		Reduced form	
	Trade (1)	ETR_K (2)	ETR_L (3)	Trade (4)	Trade*1(High-inc.) (5)	ETR_K (6)	ETR_L (7)
$Z^{gravity}$	0.068*** (0.010)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.017 (0.018)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.016* (0.008)	0.003 (0.003)
$Z^{oil-distance}$	-0.115*** (0.036)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.089*** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.011*** (0.003)
1 st -stage F-statistic	24.57			23.27	11.10		
1 st -stage Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Instruments F-statistic	24.57			41.43	25.75		
1 st -stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic	24.57			14.39			
Sample	Developing countries only			Developing and developed countries			
N	4970	4970	4970	6544	6544	6544	6544

Notes: This regression table shows the first stage and the reduced form results. The sample is developing countries ($N = 4970$) in cols. (1)-(3), and developing and developed countries ($N = 6544$) in columns (4)-(7). Trade is exports and imports divided by net domestic product. Column (1) corresponds to the first-stage in developing countries, used in Tables 1-2-3. Columns (4)-(5) correspond to the first-stage in the full sample, which estimates heterogeneous effects by development level, and which is used in Table 4. We report several 1st-stage statistics: the F-statistic of excluded instruments; the Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F-test of excluded instruments; and, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. When there is only one endogenous regressor (column 1), these three F-statistics are equivalent. Note in columns (4)-(5) that there is only one Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, which evaluates the overall strength of the first-stage, even though there are two first-stage regressions. Columns (2)-(3) and (6)-(7) report the reduced form regressions of the instruments on the effective tax rates for capital, ETR_K , and labor, ETR_L . Developing (developed) countries are low and middle-income countries (high-income countries) according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Table A4: Robustness of Results for Total Taxes and Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Total taxes (% of NDP)						
Trade	0.108* (0.063)	0.091** (0.039)	0.093*** (0.032)	0.103*** (0.032)	0.096*** (0.033)	0.176** (0.077)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel B: CIT rate (first-diff.)						
Trade	0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.031* (0.016)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel C: $\log(1+CIT\ rate)$						
Trade	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.027* (0.015)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel D: Corp. income (% of NDP)						
Trade	0.225*** (0.052)	0.210*** (0.046)	0.180*** (0.043)	0.193*** (0.044)	0.183*** (0.044)	0.181** (0.090)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel E: Mixed income (% of NDP)						
Trade	-0.199*** (0.048)	-0.175*** (0.041)	-0.191*** (0.041)	-0.201*** (0.038)	-0.191*** (0.041)	-0.112 (0.116)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel F: Capital share of NDP						
Trade	0.121*** (0.034)	0.112** (0.043)	0.157*** (0.033)	0.170*** (0.032)	0.163*** (0.034)	0.111** (0.050)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Panel G: Corp. ETR_K						
Trade	0.237* (0.131)	0.163 (0.104)	0.129* (0.075)	0.149* (0.076)	0.138* (0.075)	0.399** (0.188)
1 st stage K-P F-stat	31.24	14.24	23.09	34.83	45.17	10.80
N	4970	3984	4970	4970	4970	4970
Modifications to IV in Panel B of Table 3	NDP weights	Include country-year controls	Include 1(oil-rich)*year fixed effects	Winsorize trade at 5%-95%	Only use $Z_{gravity}$ instrument	Only use $Z_{Oil-Dist}$ instrument

Notes: This table presents robustness checks for trade's impacts on several outcomes in developing countries. Developing countries are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Trade is the sum of exports and imports divided by net domestic product (NDP). The outcome differs across panels, and the specification differs across columns: each cell is the coefficient from a separate IV regression. We report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic separately for each IV regression. Panel A is total taxes as a % of NDP. Panel B is the first-differenced corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Panel C is the percent change from log of $(1 + CIT\ rate)$. Panel D is the corporate income share of NDP. Panel E is the mixed income share of NDP. Panel F is the capital share of NDP. Panel G is the average effective tax rate on corporate profits. The different specifications across columns are the same as in Table 1 - please refer to that table for more details.

* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Table A5: Additional Heterogeneity Impacts of Trade

Heterogeneity H_c :	Small population (1)	Capital openness (2)
Panel A: CIT rate (first-diff).		
Trade	-0.065*** (0.016)	0.006 (0.038)
Trade* H_c	-0.025 (0.064)	-0.121** (0.054)
Implied coef. for Trade in H_c	-0.090 (0.055)	-0.115*** (0.028)
1 st -stage Kleibergen- Papp F-statistic	7.01	9.96
N	6544	6017
Panel B: ETR_K		
Trade	0.294 (0.207)	0.456** (0.224)
Trade* H_c	-0.696 (0.511)	-0.410 (0.296)
Implied coef. for Trade in H_c	-0.401 (0.373)	0.045 (0.104)
1 st -stage Kleibergen- Papp F-statistic	7.01	9.96
N	6544	6017
Panel C: ETR_L		
Trade	0.155** (0.070)	0.112 (0.111)
Trade* H_c	-0.006 (0.230)	0.126 (0.178)
Implied coef. for Trade in H_c	0.149 (0.199)	0.239** (0.095)
1 st -stage Kleibergen- Papp F-statistic	7.01	9.96
N	6544	6017

Notes: This table presents results from estimating heterogeneous effects of trade on outcomes in the full sample of developed and developing countries. Trade is the sum of exports and imports divided by net domestic product. We estimate an IV similar to equation 8, but where the interaction term H_c is an indicator for small population (column 1), or an indicator for capital openness (column 2). Small population takes a value of 1 if the country's population in 2018 was below 40 million. Capital openness takes a value of 1 if the country's average value of the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn & Ito, 2006) lies above the median value of all country-years. Both of these heterogeneity dimensions are therefore country-specific but time-invariant. The sample size is smaller in column (2) due to data-availability of the Chinn-Ito variable. The panels differ by outcome: panel a) is the first-differenced corporate income tax (CIT) rate; panel b) is the effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K ; panel c) is the effective tax rate on labor, ETR_L . At the bottom of each column and panel, we report the implied coefficient and estimated standard error based on the linear combination of the $Trade$ and the $Trade*H_c$ coefficients. We also report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. For more details on the IV, see Section 4.2 and 5.3. * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level.

Appendix B Data & Construction of Effective Tax Rates

This appendix section provides an overview of the data sources used to create our tax revenue and national income series (Section B.1). Additionally, we discuss the methodology to measure effective tax rates (Section B.2).

B.1 Data sources

Tax revenue data Our tax revenue data draws from three key sources:

- (i) **OECD Government Revenue Statistics** ([website link](#)): OECD revenue statistics take precedence in our data hierarchy as it contains all types of tax revenues already arranged in the OECD taxonomy of taxes. While it covers all OECD countries, it only covers a subset of developing countries which typically start in the early 2000s.
- (ii) **ICTD Government Revenue Dataset** ([website link](#)): ICTD data covers many developing countries, but only begins in the 1980s. ICTD at times does not separate income taxes into personal vs. corporate taxes and often does not contain social security contributions.
- (iii) **Archival data**: The main archival data collection corresponds to the digitization of the Government Documents section in the Lamont Library at Harvard University ([website link](#)). For each country, we scanned, tabulated and harmonized official data from the public budget and national statistical yearbooks, to retrieve official tax revenue statistics. To complement hard-copy archival data, we retrieved countries' online reports, usually published by their national statistical office or finance ministry. We relied on individual country studies to help corroborate the levels and trends of tax revenues in more historical periods. These country-by-country reviews are contained in a forthcoming case studies guide. We also used complementary sources, including offline archival Government Finance Statistics data from the IMF which covers the period 1972-1989. For social security contributions, we relied on two additional sources: the 'D61' statistic on social contributions in the household sector in SNA-1968 and SNA-2008, and data from Fisunoglu et al. (2011).

Constructing long panels of tax revenue series across sources requires making decisions about harmonization. We maintained the following guiding rules:

1. We first rely on OECD data whenever it exists. Archival data is initially second in priority, but we revise this based on whether ICTD data provides a long time series and separates income taxes. We also study if ICTD has the better match in overlapping time-periods with OECD data. We aim to use no more than two data sources per country. If discrepancies exist when data sources overlap, we inspect the accuracy of each source with additional academic studies.
2. We exclude country-years for communist/command economies. This implies that our panel size jumps in 1994, including when China and Russia first appear. The year 1994 is a few years removed from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but arguably corresponds to China's establishment of a modern tax system ([World Bank, 2008](#)) (discussed below).
3. When none of the data sources separate PIT from CIT, we use academic sources and tax legislation to assign values.
4. To guard against omitting decentralized tax revenues, we use the OECD database on subnational government finance ([link](#)) to find the countries with significant state and local taxes, and collect further data for these countries if necessary.
5. We linearly interpolate data when a given tax type is missing between observed values, but for no more than 4 years in a time-series and without extrapolation. We check for important socio-economic changes that could cast doubt on the continuity and credibility of tax revenue series, and do not interpolate between years characterized by such events.

China's establishment of a modern tax system in 1994

In our benchmark setting, we only include formerly communist economies into our data starting in 1994. Given China's weight in the global economy, it is worth reviewing the reason for that choice. The tax revenue data for China covers most of our sample period although its quality improves markedly in the 1980s. Official statistics are available online: [link here](#).

Prior to the 1980s, China had a command economy model of ‘profit delivery,’ in which the state directly received the revenues of profitable SOEs, and subsidized unprofitable ones. A corporate income tax first appears in China in 1983-84, but the majority of the base continues to be state-owned enterprises. In 1985, the tax system was further reformed into a ‘fiscal contracting’ system whereby firms negotiated a fixed lump-sum payment (regardless of economic outcomes), which cannot be split into labor versus capital taxes (nor into consumption taxes). We there exclude the ‘pseudo’-CIT revenue dating from 1985 through 1993.

Rather, we consider that China’s modern tax system began in 1994. The [World Bank \(2008\)](#) shows that, in 1994, China established for the first time a central tax administration; reformed the ‘fiscal contracting’ system; unified the PIT; created a VAT; and reduced ‘extra budgetary’ (non-tax) revenues. Thus from 1994 onward we can categorize tax revenue precisely by type, assign them to capital or labor, and estimate our *ETR*.

National accounts data To compute factor incomes of net domestic product, we combine two main data-sets from the United Nations Statistics Division. The first is the 2008 System of National Accounts (SNA) online data repository. The second is the 1968 SNA archival material. The 2008 and 1968 SNAs initially have different reporting classifications; to the best of our knowledge, our project is the first to harmonize national accounts across these two sources.²⁷ This allows us to meaningfully expand the coverage of factor incomes across space and time.

To estimate capital and labor factor incomes requires information on the 4 main sub-components that make up net domestic product (see equation 3). However, in some country-years where we have information on domestic product from an SNA data-set, there may not be data on all 4 sub-components at the same time. This is more frequently the case for the 1968 SNA than for the 2008 SNA and it is most frequent for mixed income (OS_{PUE}). In these cases, we first attempt to recover the value of the missing component using data from the other SNA dataset and national accounting identities with non-missing values for other components

²⁷A new concept in the 2008 SNA is the separation of mixed income from imputed rent. In the 1968 SNA, these concepts were subsumed under ‘entrepreneurial income of private unincorporated enterprises’ in the household sector. We maintain the 2008 SNA distinction and use accounting identities and imputations to measure OS_{PUE} and OS_{HH} where required.

within the same country-year. For the remaining cases after applying this process, we impute values for the component. All of the regressions in Sections 4-5 include dummy variables for these composite cases. For the imputation, we follow the procedure from [Blanchet et al. \(2021\)](#). The World Inequality Database uses this procedure to impute consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) when it is missing in countries' national income series. For example, applying this procedure in our setting means that we model OS_{PUE} as a function of log national income per capita, a fixed country characteristic, and an AR(1) persistence term.

Table B1 summarizes the national account coverage in our data-set. The 'Complete SNA2008' row refers to country-years where all components of net domestic product are extracted from the 2008 SNA; similarly for the 'Complete SNA1968' row. The 'Composite' row counts instances where one component (or more) of net domestic product is initially missing from an SNA data-set and is retrieved from the other SNA data-set, is calculated via accounting identities, or is imputed.

Table B1: Main Data Sources

	Country-year obs.	%
Panel A: Tax revenue data		
OECD	2866	42.3%
Archives	2681	39.4%
ICTD	1249	18.3%
<i>N</i>	6816	100%
Panel B: Factor income data		
Complete SNA2008	2463	36.1%
Complete SNA1968	1362	20.0%
Composite	2991	43.9%
<i>N</i>	6816	100%

Notes: For the 6816 country-year observations in which we estimate effective tax rates on capital and labor, panel A presents the sources of our tax revenue data while panel B presents the sources of our factor income data. For details, see Section B.1.

B.2 Construction of ETR

By combining the disaggregated tax revenues and national income components data, we construct effective tax rates on capital and on labor (equations 1 and 2 in Section 2.1). Here we provide further details on the definitions of ETR . Computing ETR_L and ETR_K requires the following information for country c , in year t :

$$ETR_L^{ct} = \frac{T_L^{ct}}{Y_L^{ct}} = \frac{\lambda_{PIT}^{ct} \cdot T_{1100}^{ct} + \lambda_{soc.sec.}^{ct} \cdot T_{2000}^{ct}}{CE^{ct} + \phi^{ct} \cdot OS_{PUE}^{ct}}$$

$$ETR_K^{ct} = \frac{T_K^{ct}}{Y_K^{ct}} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_{PIT}^{ct}) \cdot T_{1100}^{ct} + (1 - \lambda_{CIT}^{ct}) \cdot T_{1200}^{ct} + (1 - \lambda_{assets}^{ct}) \cdot T_{4000}^{ct}}{(1 - \phi^{ct}) \cdot OS_{PUE}^{ct} + OS_{CORP}^{ct} + OS_{HH}^{ct}}$$

For each type of tax j , there is a λ_j^{ct} allocation of the tax to labor which may vary by country-year (and $1 - \lambda_j^{ct}$ is the allocation to capital). The allocation for each type of tax is described in Table B2, where the types of taxes follow the OECD classification. In our benchmark assignment, these allocations are time- and country-invariant for all types of taxes, except for personal income taxes (λ_{PIT}^{ct}) which we discuss in detail below. Further, in our benchmark assumption, we assume that the labor share of mixed income, ϕ^{ct} , is fixed at 75% in all country-years ($\phi^{ct} = 0.75$). In a robustness check, we let ϕ^{ct} vary at the country-year level, based on the country-year varying labor share in the corporate sector. In our benchmark assignment, replacing the invariant parameters with their fixed numerical values, we therefore have:

$$ETR_L^{ct} = \frac{T_L^{ct}}{Y_L^{ct}} = \frac{\lambda_{PIT}^{ct} \cdot T_{1100}^{ct} + T_{2000}^{ct}}{CE^{ct} + 0.75 \cdot OS_{PUE}^{ct}}$$

$$ETR_K^{ct} = \frac{T_K^{ct}}{Y_K^{ct}} = \frac{(1 - \lambda_{PIT}^{ct}) \cdot T_{1100}^{ct} + T_{1200}^{ct} + T_{4000}^{ct}}{0.25 \cdot OS_{PUE}^{ct} + OS_{CORP}^{ct} + OS_{HH}^{ct}}$$

Below, we describe the parameter values in detail in Table B2, both for the tax revenue numerator and the national income denominator. We then provide more details on two key parameters: λ_{PIT} , the share of personal income tax revenue assigned to labor; and ϕ , the labor share of mixed income.

Table B2: Main Tax Revenue and National Accounts Concepts

Panel A: Tax Revenue				
OECD revenue classification	type of tax j	incidence λ_j on labor	notes	
1100	personal income tax (PIT)	$65\% \leq \lambda_{PIT} \leq 93\%$	Taxes on individuals (wages, capital income, capital gains). λ_{PIT}^d varies by country and year: see Section B.2 for details.	
1200	corporate income tax (CIT)	$\lambda_{CIT} = 0\%$	Un-allocable income taxes (OECD category 1300) are split equally between PIT and CIT, rare in occurrence and quantitatively small	
2000 / 3000	social security & payroll	$\lambda_{soc.sec.} = 100\%$	Includes all social security contributions as well as payroll taxes	
4000	property & wealth taxes	$\lambda_{assets} = 0\%$	Includes property, wealth and financial transaction taxes	
5000	indirect taxes	excluded	Includes trade taxes, value-added taxes and other sales taxes and excise taxes. We consider these taxes as prior to factor income returns, such that they can be excluded from factor income taxation (Browning, 1978; Saez and Zucman, 2019).	
6000	other taxes	excluded	Rare in occurrence and quantitatively small	
7000	non-tax revenue	excluded	Does not meet definition of taxation, can be quantitatively significant	
Panel B: National Accounts				
Natl. accounts acronym	national income component	allocation	notes	
CE	compensation of employees	labor	Includes wages and salaries, employer and employee social contributions, and all payments from employers to their employees	
OS _{PUE}	mixed income	$\phi = 75\%$ labor	'Operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises' includes income from self-employment, household business owners, and informal or unincorporated enterprises	
OS _{HH}	imputed rent	capital	'Operating surplus of households' is imputed rental income accruing to homeowners who live in their own home	
OS _{CORP}	corporate profits	capital	'Operating surplus of corporations' includes all corporate income after paying employees and expenses, and can be thought of as corporate-sector capital income	
OS _{GOV}	government operating surplus	—	$OS_{GOV} = 0$, by construction in national accounts	
NIT	net indirect taxes	excluded	'indirect taxes, net of subsidies' usually comprise 8-15% of national income.	
NFI	net foreign income	—	We treat domestic income without balancing the accounts to foreign earned income: many countries tax income earned domestically, regardless of citizenship, whereas net foreign income is taxed only with difficulty	
CFC	depreciation	excluded	Factor income and our <i>ETR</i> are expressed net of 'consumption of fixed capital'	

Labor share of personal income taxes: λ_{PIT} As discussed in Section 2.1, the level of PIT revenue that derives from capital versus labor income is rarely directly observed.²⁸ Thus, within personal income tax (PIT), an important parameter is the share of revenue assigned to labor, denoted λ_{PIT} . In the United States, [Piketty et al. \(2018\)](#) find that approximately 85% of PIT revenue is from labor and 15% from capital. To construct country-year specific λ_{PIT}^{ct} , we start from the US benchmark ($\lambda_{PIT} = 85\%$), to which we make two country-year specific adjustments:

- (a) First, the location of the PIT exemption threshold in the income distribution impacts λ_{PIT} , since the capital income share is higher for richer individuals. We retrieve PIT exemption thresholds from [Jensen \(2022\)](#). We assume countries with a higher PIT exemption threshold have a higher λ_{PIT} . Since the US has a low exemption threshold with $\lambda_{PIT} = 85\%$, we similarly assign 85% of PIT to labor in countries for which the PIT covers half or more of the workforce (mainly high-income countries). For countries where the PIT covers 1% or less of the workforce (lowest-income countries), we assign a maximum PIT capital share of 30%. For PIT thresholds with a coverage between 1% to 50% of the workforce, we linearly assign λ_{PIT} between 70% and 85%.
- (b) Second, we assume that countries where a dual PIT system is in place have a larger λ_{PIT} . Dual PIT systems set capital income taxation to a lower—often flat—rate, while labor income is taxed with progressive marginal tax rates. We compute the measure of the percent difference between the tax rate on dividends and the top marginal tax rate on labor income. Data on dividend vs wage income tax rates are taken from OECD Revenue Statistics and country-specific tax code documents. Since we only have dividend rates, we assume that 50% of capital income in PIT benefits from the lower rate (e.g., capital gains might not benefit). For this 50%, we multiply λ_{PIT} by the percent difference in dividend versus top marginal tax rates.

Labor share of mixed income: ϕ Section 2.1 noted the difficulty of estimating the labor share of mixed income (unincorporated enterprises). We assume a benchmark measure of $\phi = 75\%$. This measure is lower than the 30% used in Distributional

²⁸PIT revenue from capital income includes taxes on dividends and capital gains and on the capital share of self-employment income. OECD revenue data occasionally reports on tax revenue from capital gains, which was on average 4% of PIT in the period 2010-2018 (7.5% in the US).

National Accounts (DINA) guidelines (Blanchet et al., 2021). However, given that the global average of the corporate capital share is 27%, assuming that the capital share of unincorporated enterprises is slightly lower seems reasonable (see Guerrieri, 2019). We implement two robustness checks: (i) $\phi = 100\%$, such that all mixed income is labor income; and (ii) $\phi^{ct} = \frac{CE^{ct}}{CE^{ct} + OS_{CORP}^{ct}}$, setting the labor share of mixed income equal to that of the corporate sector at the country-year level.

In addition, we implemented the method developed in ILO (2019), which consists in assigning labor income to self-employed based on the overlap in observable characteristics with employees. However, the data required for this method existed in only a subset of our *ETR* sample. Moreover, imputing the missing data-points in our sample led sometimes to non-sensical values of national account components and incorporating these imputed values implicitly affects all the initially non-missing components (through accounting identities). We therefore did not make use of this method in the main text. Notwithstanding, results based on ILO (2019) are available upon request: they do not alter our main findings.

Mixed income in China and the US We make minor mixed-income adjustments to the benchmark series for China and for the United States. In China, we adjust our benchmark factor incomes following Piketty, Yang and Zucman (2019). The authors show that in the 2008 SNA data, the income of many self-employed agricultural workers is attributed to employee compensation and not to mixed income (as it should be, and as in other countries). We revise upwards the mixed income values based on Piketty, Yang and Zucman (2019), but subtract the corresponding increase from employee compensation to keep the aggregated value constant.

In the case of the US, we use estimates of factor shares in NDP from Piketty et al. (2018), who incorporate a granular treatment of mixed income to reflect the specificity of the US non-corporate business sector. In the US, some large businesses (including listed firms) are organized as partnerships (as opposed to corporations) and are classified as non-corporate businesses, while they would be treated as corporations in other countries. Their income is counted as mixed income in the SNA of the US (rather than as corporate profits). The revised US series therefore (i) assumes a higher capital share of income for partnerships vs. other non-corporate businesses; and (ii) factors in the rising capital intensity of partnerships since the 1980s.

Appendix C Trade Liberalization Event Studies

C.1 Description of liberalization events

Our selection of trade events is determined by three criteria. First, the event is related to measurable policy reforms; this improves the transparency of the event-study design which is based on a well-defined policy event. Second, the policy reforms induced large changes in trade barriers; this increases the likelihood of observing sharp breaks in our macroeconomic outcomes around the event-time. Third, the event has been studied in academic publications; this allows us to rely on events for which the positive effects on openness have previously been established.

Selection of events These criteria led us to focus on the six trade liberalization events referenced in review articles by [Goldberg and Pavcnik \(2007, 2016\)](#) to which we add China's WTO accession event ([studied in Brandt et al., 2017](#)). Most of these selected events feature reductions in tariff rates: many of the countries did not participate in the early GATT/WTO negotiation rounds, making reductions in tariffs an available policy lever. The tariff reductions were large: Brazil cut tariff rates from 59% to 15%, India from 80% to 39% percent, and China from 48% to 20%. Mexico reduced tariff rates from 24% to 12% and import licence requirements went from covering 93% of national production to 25%; Colombia's tariffs were reduced from 27% to 10% and import requirements dropped from 72% of national production coverage to 1%. In the selected countries, "tariff reductions constitute a big part of the globalization process" ([Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2016](#)). The timing of the events and academic references are provided in Table [A1](#).

Timing of events Below are narrative analyses for some of the events:

- **Brazil** The liberalization event of 1988 is detailed in Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017). The authors note: "In an effort to increase transparency in trade policy, the government reduced tariff redundancy by cutting nominal tariffs... Liberalization effectively began when the newly elected administration suddenly and unexpectedly abolished the list of suspended import licences and removed nearly all of the remaining special customs regimes."

- **Columbia** Similarly to Brazil, tariff reductions in Colombia in 1985 were driven by the country's decision to impose uniform rates across products and industries under the negotiation commitments to the WTO. [Goldberg and Pavcnik \(2007\)](#) note that this reform objective makes "the endogeneity of trade policy changes less pronounced here [in Colombia] than in other studies."
- **China** [Brandt et al. \(2017\)](#) note that trade openness reforms had gradually been implemented in China prior to the country's WTO accession in 2001, but that the tariff reductions implemented upon accession were large, "less voluntary" and largely complied with the pre-specified WTO accession agreements. Importantly, the potential accession to WTO contributed to the timing of privatization initiatives, in which the Chinese government restructured and reduced its ownership in state-owned enterprises. While the privatization efforts began in 1995 and were incremental, it is possible that additional sell-offs in the post-WTO years contribute to the observed break in trends in our outcomes.
- **India** The 1991 event in India occurred as a result of an IMF intervention that dictated the pace and scope of the liberalization reforms. Under the IMF program, tariff rates had to be harmonized across industries, which, like in Brazil and Colombia, led to a large average reduction in tariffs. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) argue the Indian reform "came as a surprise" and "was unanticipated by firms in India." The reforms were implemented quickly "as a sort of shock therapy with little debate or analysis." The IMF program was in response to India's balance of payment crisis, which was triggered by "the drop in remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East, the increase in oil prices due to the Gulf War, and political uncertainty following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi".
- **Vietnam** The 2001 reform in Vietnam was implemented as a broad trade agreement that did not involve negotiations over specific tariffs ([McCaig & Pavcnik, 2018](#)). The reform was driven by the American government's decision to reclassify Vietnam from 'Column 2' of the US tariff schedule to the 'Normal Trade Relations'. Column 2 was designed in the early 1950s for the 21 communist countries, including Vietnam, with whom the US did not have normal trading relations. [McCaig and Pavcnik \(2018\)](#) show that there are no differential trends between Vietnamese exports to the US vs other high-income countries.

These descriptions of reform timing do not suggest that the liberalization events were directly triggered by changes in domestic taxation or factor incomes.

[Goldberg and Pavcnik \(2007\)](#) note other cross-border reforms that occurred in the post-years of the liberalization events. Argentina’s 1989 event and Brazil’s 1988 event were followed by accession to Mercosur in 1991; India’s 1991 event was followed by foreign direct investment liberalization in 1993; and Mexico’s 1985 WTO accession was followed by a removal of capital inflow restrictions in 1989. These reforms occurred with some lag to the trade liberalization events. These additional reforms also reduced cross-border barriers and may have contributed to the medium-run effects observed in Figure 5.

C.2 Event study methodology

Sample construction Our sample is constructed by applying a synthetic matching procedure to every treated country for each outcome of interest. The donor pool has to be fully balanced in all pre-event periods. To estimate the event study in equation (4) for a given outcome, the sample pools the seven treated countries and their synthetic control countries for 10 years before and after the events (yielding 294 observations). We also estimate the difference-in-differences (DiD) model:

$$y_{ct} = \beta^{DiD} \cdot \mathbb{1}(e \geq 0)_t \cdot D_c + \theta_t + \kappa_c + \pi_{Year(t)} + \epsilon_{ct}$$

which uses the same notation as equation (4). Moreover, we use the imputation method by [Borusyak et al. \(2021\)](#) to report average treatment effects comparable to β^{DiD} with a technique that deals with issues with two-way fixed effects and heterogeneous event timing. Details are provided in the [supplementary appendix \(link\)](#). All the DiD average treatment effects are reported in Table A2.

Simultaneously matching on main outcomes We test that our results hold up with a more restrictive synthetic control. Specifically, we use our three main outcomes—trade, ETR_K and ETR_L —to construct one synthetic control group per treated country. This still allows us run separate regressions for each outcome, but the composition of the control group is now held constant across regressions. The results are reported in Figure A6 and Table A2.

Appendix D Instrumental Variables for Trade

In this section, we outline the construction of the two instrumental variables. Both instruments are drawn from [Egger et al. \(2019\)](#), who provide further details.

Instrument based on quantitative trade models The first instrument leverages the structure of gravity models in general equilibrium. These models permit calibration of country pair-year-specific trade costs from trade data, relying on three key assumptions: (i) producers are perfectly competitive and make zero profits or charge a constant markup; (ii) trade costs take the iceberg form; and (iii) aggregate expenditure and its allocation across products are separable. These assumptions imply that bilateral consumption shares towards country o by consumers in country c in year t , denoted π_{cot} , have multiplicative components that are exporter-year-specific (ψ_{ot}), importer-year-specific (ι_{ct}) and pair-year-specific (β_{cot}):

$$\pi_{cot} = \psi_{ot} \times \iota_{ct} \times \beta_{cot}$$

The component ψ_{ot} is proportional to country o 's supply potential and captures production costs and gross-of-tax factor income—and might be influenced by both capital and labor taxation. The component ι_{ct} depends on the consumer price index, which varies across years and countries.²⁹ β_{cot} captures trade frictions across country-pairs and time.³⁰ The product of the normalized shares gives the bilateral frictions of importing-exporting country-pairs at a point in time:

$$\frac{\pi_{cot}}{\pi_{cct}} \cdot \frac{\pi_{oct}}{\pi_{oot}} = \beta_{cot} \cdot \beta_{oct}$$

Finally, we use $\beta_{cot} \cdot \beta_{oct}$ to compute the average ct -specific costs of exporting and importing, which constitutes the instrument:

$$Z_{ct}^{gravity} = \sum_{o \neq c} [\beta_{cot} \cdot \beta_{oct}]$$

²⁹Both ψ_{ot} and ι_{ct} may capture country-year-specific trade costs, but the pair-specific component β_{cot} is free of such country-year specific influence.

³⁰[Egger et al. \(2019\)](#) exploit the multiplicative model structure about π_{cot} to recover measures of β_{cot} . They assume that transaction costs between domestic sellers and customers are zero, such that $\beta_{cct} = 1$. Both the importer-year component and exporter-year component can then be eliminated by normalizing import and export trade shares by the importer and exporters' consumption from domestic sellers.

Note that all exporter-year and importer-year factors are removed from the instrument. This instrument is valid so long as the *distribution* of trade costs among country-pairs (not its level) is not influenced by the level of, e.g., factor incomes or effective taxation. Constructing this instrument requires data on country-pair trade flows: we use UN COMTRADE data to construct a large sample of bilateral consumption shares.³¹ First-stage regressions with $Z_{ct}^{gravity}$ are shown in Table A3.

Instrument based on global oil prices & transport distances The second instrument exploits spatial heterogeneity across countries in a way that interacts with oil price shocks. This instrument is based on global oil price changes over time and within-country transportation distances from cities to the nearest port.³² The instrument is the variance of the product oil price $p_t^{oil} \times$ distance d_c^k across cities k in country c in year t :

$$Z_{ct}^{oil-dist} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^3 [(p_t^{oil} d_c^k - p_t^{oil} \bar{d}_c)^2]$$

where \bar{d}_c is the average city-port distance in country c . This variance increases in countries whose main cities are far from the nearest port and far from each other, which implies a larger change to transportation costs following a global oil price shock in spread-out countries than in countries with concentrated populations. It is this transportation-cost shock that the instrument captures.³³

This second instrument does not hinge on theoretical assumptions. Instead it relies on the assumption that the distribution of trade-costs induced by global oil price shocks is not correlated with contemporaneous changes in factor incomes and effective tax rates. First-stage results for $Z_{ct}^{oil-dist}$ are presented in Table A3.

³¹We augment our raw data from COMTRADE with data from [Bustos and Yildirim \(2022\)](#), who harmonized importer- and exporter-reported trade flows to expand the coverage and improve the precision of country-partner-year trade flow estimates.

³²For the former, we retrieve the OPEC Reference Basket benchmark world price of crude oil. For the latter, we measure road distances from the three largest cities (according to UN population statistics) to their nearest port, using SeaRates international shipping logistics calculators.

³³Alternatively, one could measure the variance in distance and then multiply it by the global oil price. The distribution of the variance instrument $Z_{ct}^{oil-dist}$ across country-years would not change; the only impact would be a level-shift by the price. We consider the main approach to more closely capture the sensitivity of transport costs to spatial concentration, but results based on this alternative variance measure are similar.

Appendix E Additional Analyses of Tax Capacity

E.1 Firm-level analysis in Rwanda

In this section, we investigate the relationship between trade exposure and the effective capital tax rate for formal firms in Rwanda.

Data Our analysis draws on three administrative data sources from Rwanda, accessible at the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), for the years 2015-2017. These data-sources can be linked through unique tax identifiers for each firm, assigned by the RRA for the purpose of collecting customs, corporate income and value-added taxes. The first data-source is the customs records, which contains information on international trade transactions made in each year by each firm. We use this data to measure each firm’s direct imports. The second data is the firms’ corporate income tax (CIT) declarations merged with the firm registry. These data contain detailed information on firms’ profits, income and costs, as well as information on industry codes and geographical location. We use these data to measure firms’ effective tax rate on profits. The third data-source is the business-to-business transactions database. These data are retrieved through the electronic billing machines (EBM) that all firms registered for VAT are legally required to install and use (Eissa and Zeitlin, 2014). For a given seller, EBMs record the transactions to each buyer identified by the tax firm-ID. We use this data to measure buyer-seller relationships.

When combined, these data allow us to construct the buyer-supplier relationships of the Rwandan formal economy and document firms’ direct and indirect trade exposure. Importantly, since the network data is based on tax-IDs to link firms, this data-requirement implies that we cannot observe transaction linkages with informal, non-registered firms. Most recent studies on firm networks in developing countries also feature this sample selection on formal firms, by virtue of using tax-administrative data to build networks, including in Chile (Huneus, 2020); Costa Rica (Alfaro-Ureña et al.); Ecuador (Adao et al., 2022); India (Gadenne et al., 2022); Turkey (Demir et al., 2021); and Uganda (Almunia et al., 2021, 2023).

Our sample is the set of firms registered for CIT (to measure ETR_K) and VAT (to measure firm linkages) and which report positive income during the years 2015-2017. Only a small number of firms are registered for CIT or VAT but not both; however, restricting the sample to positive income is consequential, as a significant

number of registered CIT-VAT firms are 'nil filers' that report zero income ('nil filers' are common in developing countries: Keen, 2012). It is in principle also possible to measure ETR_K amongst firms that are registered for turnover taxes. However, only a small number of these firms are also registered for VAT (due to a combination of eligibility criteria, size and segmented trading networks: Gadenne et al., 2022); including them does not alter the main findings (results available). We construct the corporate effective tax rate in all firm-years using the method from Bachas et al. (2020). This variable to corporate ETR_i^K in equation (6).

Exposure to trade To measure a firm's total exposure to trade, we follow Dhyne et al. (2021) who use similar administrative data-sets as ours to measure trade exposure of Belgian firms. We define firm i 's total foreign input share as the share of inputs that it directly imports (s_{Fi}), plus the share of inputs that it buys from its domestic suppliers l (s_{li}), multiplied by the total import shares of those firms:

$$s_i^{Total} = s_{Fi} + \sum_{l \in V_i} s_{li} \cdot [s_{Fl} + \sum_{r \in V_l} s_{rl} \cdot (s_{Fr} + \dots)] \quad (9)$$

where V_i is the set of domestic suppliers of firm i , and V_l is the set of domestic suppliers of firm l . The denominator of the input shares is the sum of purchases from other firms and imports. Note that the definition of the total foreign input share in equation (9) is recursive: a firm's total foreign input share is the sum of its direct foreign input share and the share of its inputs from other firms, multiplied by those firms' total foreign input shares. We limit the calculation to the inputs from a firm's immediate suppliers l as well as the suppliers to their suppliers r (adding more network-levels only marginally increases s_i^{Total}). In other words, s_i^{Total} reflects the direct import share of firm i 's suppliers and the suppliers' suppliers, each weighted by the share of inputs that each firm buys from other domestic firms. We focus on Rwandan firms' exposure to international imports through their supply network; a similar exercise can be conducted to measure firms' exposure to exports through their client network.

Figure E1 displays a histogram of s_i^{Total} and s_{Fi} for all formal Rwandan firms. While just under 30% of firms import directly, 93% rely on trade either directly or indirectly through suppliers which use foreign inputs in their production process. Indeed, most formal firms are strongly dependent on foreign trade, but only a limited number show that dependence through the direct foreign inputs observed

in customs data: in the median firm, for example, the total foreign input share is 48% (it is 39% for the median Belgian firm in [Dhyne et al., 2021](#)).

Impacts of trade exposure on ETR^K and size To visualize the association between trade exposure and effective capital taxation, we plot binned scatters of the variables against each other, after residualizing both s_i^{Total} and ETR_i^K against year fixed effects. In Figure E2, the dots correspond to equal sized bins of the residualized trade exposure variable. The line corresponds to the best linear fit regression on the underlying firm-level data ($N = 18478$). Figure E2 reveals a positive and strongly significant association: firms that are more exposed to international trade, both through direct imports and through links to importers in the supply network, have higher effective tax rates on corporate profits.

We investigate the robustness of this association in Panel A of Table E1, where we estimate regressions of the form

$$ETR_{itg}^K = \mu \cdot s_{it}^{Total} + \Theta \cdot X_{it} + \pi_t + \pi_g + \epsilon_{itg} \quad (10)$$

where ETR_{itg}^K and s_{it}^{Total} are corporate effective tax rate and trade exposure of firm i in year t in industry-geography group g and π_t and π_g are fixed effects for year and industry-geography. ϵ_{itg} is clustered at the industry-geography level (robust to clustering at firm-level). Column (1) corresponds to the association in Figure E2. Column (2) adds 561 industry-geography interactive fixed effects between industry categories and geographical locations. In column (3), we add time-varying controls, including firm age, number of employees, and total number of clients and suppliers. In column (4), we leverage the panel-nature and include firm fixed effects. The variation in trade exposure is now within-firm over time and can come, for example, from new linkages with suppliers that import directly or rely significantly on foreign inputs. In column (4), we cluster ϵ_{itg} at the firm level.

In column (5), we employ an instrumental variable that creates trade shocks from changes in world export supply of country-product combinations in which a firm had a previous import relationship. Previous studies have used this strategy, arguing that the shocks are plausibly exogenous and vary significantly across firms because firms do not have all inputs in common. Specifically, we follow the design in [Dhyne et al. \(2021\)](#) that extends the shift-share approach of [Hummels et al. \(2014\)](#) to a setting with shock pass-through via network linkages. To construct the direct

import shock for firm i , we use information about the firm's product-country-level imports in year $t - 1$ (the share variable capturing firm-specific shock exposure) and the aggregate shift in world export supply for each country and product:

$$\log M_{it}^D = \log \sum_{a,c} s_{ic,t-1}^{a,M} \cdot WES_{a,c,t} \quad (11)$$

where $s_{ic,t-1}^{a,M}$ is the share of imports of firm i in the initial year $t - 1$ that falls on product a from country c , and $WES_{a,c,t}$ is the world export supply (excluding sales to Rwanda) of country c for product a . For firm i 's suppliers, we construct the weighted average of their import shocks, using i 's input share from each supplier in the previous year as the weights. We also construct the weighted average of the trade shocks of the suppliers to the suppliers of firm i , using the recursive formulation in equation (9). This gives us three instruments, namely import trade shocks direct to firm i , $\log M_{it}^D$, as well as shocks to its suppliers, $\log M_{it}^S$, and shocks to the suppliers to its suppliers, $\log M_{it}^{SS}$. The 1st-stage regression is then:

$$s_{it}^{Total} = \beta_1 \cdot \log M_{it}^D + \beta_2 \cdot \log M_{it}^S + \beta_3 \cdot \log M_{it}^{SS} + \kappa_t + \kappa_g + \epsilon_{it} \quad (12)$$

and the 2nd-stage is equation (10). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.

In column (5), we find that increases in a firm's trade exposure, when instrumented by the import shocks, cause an increase in the effective corporate tax rate. The instruments are relevant, with a 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 18.17.³⁴

In Section 5, we argued that trade may positively impact ETR^K through its effect on size (as tax enforcement is stronger on larger firms). We investigate this in Panels B and C of Table E1. In Panel B, we find, across the various specifications including IV, that more exposure to international trade increases a firm's size. We proxy for size with total annual revenue. Panel C reveals a positive association between size and a firm's effective corporate tax rate in the different specifications, though we cannot employ the IV strategy due to the exclusion restriction.

We have focused on firms' exposure to imports through their supply network, but firms may also be impacted by imports through their client (demand) network.

³⁴Our results are robust to controlling for two additional types of trade shocks. First, we can control for shocks to the potential suppliers of firm i , defined as the set of firms that operate in the same industry and geographical area as i 's current suppliers but that are not currently supplying to i . Second, we can control for shocks to firm i 's horizontal suppliers, defined as the set of firms that are suppliers to firm i 's current clients.

In an extension, we find that increased output exposure to imports through the client network has positive effects on ETR^K (results available), though this average effect could mask heterogeneity across firms depending on the complementarity between imports and domestic inputs.

These firm-level findings in Rwanda are consistent with our tax-capacity hypothesis (Section 5) and country-level results (Tables 1-4), whereby trade increases ETR^K in developing countries and the effect is mediated through trade's impact on size, as larger firms have higher effective capital taxation.

E.2 Type of trade analysis

We investigate whether openness has differential impacts on effective tax rates and formalization-outcomes depending on the nature of the trade variation. As discussed in Section 5.4, we use our two instruments to investigate the impacts of: (i) imports versus exports (of trade in both intermediate G-S and final G-S); (ii) trade in intermediate G-S versus final G-S (summed across imports and exports). We use UN's Broad Economic Categories (Rev. 5) to classify final versus intermediate goods-services (G-S), combining capital goods with the latter category.

For the imports versus exports IV analysis, the two 1st-stage regressions are

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\text{imp}_{ct}) &= \beta_1 \cdot Z_{ct}^{\text{gravity}} + \beta_2 \cdot Z_{ct}^{\text{oil-dist}} + \mu_c + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ct} \\ \log(\text{exp}_{ct}) &= \pi_1 \cdot Z_{ct}^{\text{gravity}} + \pi_2 \cdot Z_{ct}^{\text{oil-dist}} + \eta_c + \eta_t + \iota_{ct} \end{aligned}$$

where $\log(\text{imp}_{ct})$ and $\log(\text{exp}_{ct})$ are the logs of the ratio of total imports to NDP and total exports to NDP, respectively, in country c in year t . We use the log-transformation because it improves the 1st-stage (results without logs are qualitatively similar but less precise). The 2nd-stage in the IV is

$$y_{ct} = \theta_1 \cdot \log(\text{imp}_{ct}) + \theta_2 \cdot \log(\text{exp}_{ct}) + \kappa_c + \kappa_t + \phi_{ct}$$

The set-up is similar for the second IV (intermediate G-S vs final G-S) where we replace $\log(\text{imp}_{ct})$ and $\log(\text{exp}_{ct})$ with log of the ratio of total trade in intermediate G-S to NDP and log of the ratio of total trade in final G-S to NDP.


IV results for developing countries are in panel A of Table E2, with 1st-stage regressions in panel B. Two comments are in order. First, the two IVs could in

theory impact the different types of trade (Bergstrand and Egger, 2010). In practice, $Z^{gravity}$ significantly predicts all types of trade, while $Z^{oil-dist}$ significantly predicts imports and final G-S but not exports or intermediate G-S (Panel B). It is unclear if the instruments generate a strong overall first-stage. We gauge this by inspecting the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics, which are not well above conventional threshold levels (10.18 and 7.39). Given this challenge, we limit our scope to studying whether the coefficient signs for the different types of trade are consistent with our simplified predictions (and whether they are statistically different from each other). Second, the exclusion restriction requires that the endogenous regressors always add up to total trade openness. Thus we cannot implement an IV which focuses on the impacts of final versus intermediate G-S for, say, imports only. This also implies that, for a given outcome, the hypotheses in our two IVs (final versus intermediate G-S; imports versus exports) will be correlated. We accordingly adjust the p-values for multiple hypotheses testing using the Romano-Wolf method.

Focusing on the IV results in panel A, column (1) shows that exports increase ETR_K while imports decrease it; column (2) shows that trade in intermediate G-S increases ETR_K while trade in final G-S decreases it. In each IV, the coefficients imply a positive overall effect of trade openness on ETR_K even if the two trade-types had equal shares of NDP. In practice, many developing countries run trade surpluses (UNCTAD, 2014) and trade more in intermediate G-S than final G-S (Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis, 2009). We can statistically reject that the different trade-types have the same impact on ETR_K , at 10% for exports vs imports and at 1% for intermediate G-S vs final G-S. Similar patterns hold for ETR_L (columns 3 and 4). The remaining columns uncover similar differential impacts on formalization-outcomes. Exports cause a reallocation of output-share away from non-corporate income to corporate income (μ_C in equation 6), while imports lead to a decrease in the corporate income-share. Trade in intermediate G-S increases the corporate income-share while trade in final G-S decreases it. Results are similar for the average corporate effective tax rate (\overline{ETR}_C^K in equation 6).


Since we only have 2 instruments, we cannot decisively conclude on the impacts for the 4 types of trade (imports of intermediate G-S, exports of intermediate G-S, imports of final G-S, exports of final G-S). Notwithstanding, the signs of the four estimated IV coefficients are consistent with imports of final G-S decreasing ETR_K and formalization-outcomes, and imports of intermediate G-S increasing them.

Figure E1: Rwandan Firms' Direct and Total Exposure to Trade in Imports



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of direct foreign input share, s_{Fi} , and total foreign input share, s_i^{Total} , for all formal firms in Rwanda between 2015 and 2017. The measures are calculated annually, and the figure pools all firm-year observations. The horizontal line represent a scale break in the vertical axis. More details in Section E.1.

Figure E2: Rwandan Firms' Trade Exposure and Corporate Effective Tax Rate



Notes: This figure shows the association between total foreign input share, s_i^{Total} , and the corporate effective tax rate, ETR_i^K , for all formal firms in Rwanda between 2015 and 2017. The graph plots binned scatters of the variables against each other, after residualizing both variables against year fixed effects. The dots correspond to equal sized bins of the residualized trade exposure variable. The line corresponds to the best linear fit regression on the underlying firm-level data ($N = 18478$), which is also reported in column (1) of Table E1.

Table E1: Firm-Level Regressions in Rwanda: ETR^K , Trade and Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A outcome: ETR^K					
S^{Total}	0.100*** (0.021)	0.087*** (0.017)	0.075*** (0.017)	0.025* (0.014)	0.133** (0.060)
Panel B outcome: Log sales					
S^{Total}	1.362*** (0.466)	1.351** (0.542)	1.078** (0.475)	0.202* (0.107)	1.444*** (0.233)
Panel C outcome: ETR^K					
Log sales	0.040* (0.023)	0.092*** (0.029)	0.077** (0.027)	0.029*** (0.003)	- -
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV
1 st -stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic					18.17
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Geography FEs		Y	Y		
Firm controls			Y	Y	
Firm FEs				Y	Y
N	18478	18478	18478	18478	18478

Notes: This table presents regression results from a sample of formal firms in Rwanda between 2015 and 2017. The outcome differs across panels: panels A) and C) is the effective tax rate on corporate profits, ETR^K ; panel B) is log of annual sales. In panels A) and B), the reported regression coefficient is for total foreign input share, S^{Total} ; in panel C), it is for log annual sales. Columns (1)-(4) present OLS results from estimating variations of equation (10): Column (1) includes year fixed effects; column (2) adds industry-geography fixed effects; column (3) adds firm-year controls (firm age, number of employees, and total number of clients and suppliers); column (4) adds firm fixed effects. Column (5) is the IV estimation where the total foreign input share (S^{Total}) is instrumented with trade-shocks to firms and their supplier network based on the shift-share design of [Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang, 2014](#). The instruments are described in detail in equation (11) in Section E.1. In column (5), we also report the 1st-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic from estimating the 1st-stage in equation (12). * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry-geography level in columns (1)-(3), and at the firm-level in columns (4)-(5) (results are robust to clustering at firm-level in all columns).

Table E2: Type of Trade Analysis in Developing Countries

Panel A: IV	ETR_K		ETR_L		Corporate Income		Mixed Income		Corporate ETR_K	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Export of G-S	0.406 (0.258) [0.079]		0.184** (0.092) [0.019]		0.374** (0.181) [0.092]		-0.227* (0.136) [0.119]		0.475 (0.287) [0.053]	
Import of G-S	-0.295* (0.151) [0.075]		-0.153*** (0.049) [0.008]		-0.265** (0.108) [0.097]		0.136 (0.089) [0.125]		-0.345** (0.149) [0.051]	
Intermediate G-S		0.270*** (0.100) [0.039]		0.115*** (0.042) [0.013]		0.252*** (0.072) [0.046]		-0.162*** (0.060) [0.033]		0.316*** (0.101) [0.033]
Final G-S		-0.204*** (0.065) [0.037]		-0.105*** (0.026) [0.006]		-0.185*** (0.049) [0.019]		0.096** (0.046) [0.119]		-0.239*** (0.050) [0.006]
F-test: Equality of coefficients [p-value]	2.99 [0.086]	8.45 [0.004]	5.75 [0.018]	10.88 [0.001]	5.01 [0.027]	13.49 [0.000]	2.68 [0.104]	6.08 [0.015]	3.59 [0.060]	13.77 [0.000]
N	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572	4572

Panel B: 1 st -stage	Import of G-S	Export of G-S	Intermediate G-S	Final G-S
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$Z^{gravity}$	0.277*** (0.037)	0.248*** (0.058)	0.274*** (0.035)	0.269*** (0.055)
$Z^{oil-distance}$	-0.085*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.019)	0.019 (0.013)	-0.121*** (0.023)
1 st -stage F-statistic	131.83	21.29	65.03	82.09
1 st -stage Sanderson-Windmeijer Weak Instrument F-statistic	35.70	33.25	51.78	55.50
1 st -stage Kleibergen-Papp F statistic		7.39	10.18	
N	4572	4572	4572	4572

Notes: The sample is developing countries, which are low and middle-income countries according to the World Bank income classification in 2018. Panel A presents IV results, while panel B presents 1st-stage results. In panel A's odd-numbered columns, imports and exports are the regressors while in even-numbered columns it is trade in intermediate goods and services (G-S) and trade in final G-S. Outcomes differ across columns in panel A: in cols. (1)-(2), effective tax rate on capital, ETR_K ; in cols. (3)-(4), effective tax rate on labor, ETR_L ; in cols. (5)-(6), corporate income share of net domestic product; in cols. (7)-(8), mixed income share of net domestic product; in cols. (9)-(10), average effective tax rate on corporate profits. For details on the outcomes and the instruments, see Table 1 and 3. Relative to those tables, the drop in sample size in this table is due to availability of the type of trade classification. For each coefficient, we report in brackets the p-values which correct for multiple hypotheses testing, using the Romano-Wolf method. Multiple hypothesis testing is accounted for within each outcome between the two IV estimations (exports and imports; final G-S and intermediate G-S). At the bottom of each column in panel A, we report the F-test for the equality of coefficients. In panel B, cols. (1)-(2) correspond to the first-stage regression that instruments simultaneously for imports and exports; cols. (3)-(4) is the first-stage regression which instruments simultaneously for intermediate G-S and final G-S. In panel B, we report the F-statistic of excluded instruments; the Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F-test of excluded instruments; and, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. For more details, see Section E.2.

Appendix F Capital Liberalization Events


To attempt to investigate the impact of capital liberalization on effective tax rates, we draw on [Chari et al. \(2012\)](#). The authors measure capital liberalization events in 25 developing countries as the date when foreign investment in the domestic stock market was first allowed. They show that these events significantly increase foreign capital inflows, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and import of capital goods.³⁵ Compared to other policies aimed at lifting FDI restrictions, liberalizing the domestic stock market occurs at a precise point in time, is not marked by policy-reversal or net capital outflow, and is unambiguously related to capital liberalization (Eichengreen, 2001). We employ the empirical design of Section 4.1 and create a synthetic control country for each of the 25 treated countries and for each outcome. We measure capital openness as the total sum of the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities (Gygli et al., 2019). We find similar results when using alternative measures of capital openness, including portfolio equity assets and liabilities and the KOF financial globalization index (Gygli et al., 2019).

Figure F1 reports the event-study results. Relative to a stable pre-trend, we observe a sustained rise in capital openness precisely at the time of the event. ETR_K also increases, with a small lag to the timing of the capital liberalization event; in the medium-run, the positive effect on ETR_K is significant at the 5% level. There is no discernible effect on ETR_L . Similar to the reasoning for the trade tax-capacity mechanism, the inflow of foreign capital, as well as any subsequent increase in capital goods imports and aggregate investment, may positively impact ETR_K by contributing to the growth of firms and/or by causing an expansion of initially larger firms. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the capital liberalization events led to increases in the corporate income-share and the average corporate effective tax rate (results not shown but available).

One important limitation is that the events considered here remove restrictions on capital *inflows* and are not informative of the impacts of increased capital *outflows*. In general, more work is needed to understand the determinants of policies which impact cross-border capital flows in developing countries and their effects on ETR .

³⁵FDI includes green field investments (building plants from scratch) and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). [Chari et al. \(2012\)](#) note that M&A is impacted by stock market liberalization, makes up to 40-60% of FDI in developing countries, and can trigger subsequent green field investments.

Figure F1: Event Study of Capital Liberalization Reforms



Notes: These panels show event-studies for capital liberalization reforms in the 25 developing countries of [Chari, Henry, and Sasson \(2012\)](#). The panels correspond to different outcomes: capital openness (top panels); effective tax rate on capital (middle panels); effective tax rate on labor (bottom panels). Capital openness is the total sum of the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, in constant USD. We use the log transformation for this outcome; results where the total sum is expressed as a percent of GDP are similar. The left-hand graphs show the average level of the outcome in every year to/since the event, for treated countries and for synthetic control countries. The right-hand graphs show the estimated β_e coefficients on the to/since dummies, based on equation (4) but where the trade liberalization events are replaced with capital liberalization events. The bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and estimated with the wild bootstrap method. The top-left corners report the F-statistic on joint significance of the post-event dummies, with the p-value in parentheses. Details are in Appendix F.